De-radicalization of Muslim communities in the UK by Mushtaq, Rehan
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-06
De-radicalization of Muslim communities in the UK
Mushtaq, Rehan













DE-RADICALIZATION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES  








 Thesis Advisor:   Anna Simons 
 Second Reader: Heather Gregg 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  De-Radicalization of Muslim Communities in the 
U.K. 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Rehan Mushtaq 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This study examines why and how Islamists’ message of radicalization spread like a social 
contagion among UK Muslim communities during the 1990s. The thesis hypothesizes that a small number 
of Islamists, with smartly contextualized ideas, given a receptive environment, can spread their influence 
rapidly.  
Borrowing from Social Movement Theory and other works, this thesis elaborates how, through 
word-of-mouth and interpersonal communications, a relatively small number of people can successfully 
initiate a social epidemic of religious extremism. By following simple rules of marketing, Islamists made 
their message stickier.    
To counter radicalization, the study suggests a paradigm shift: instead of countering the Islamists 
on theological grounds, reinvigoration of “family” is proposed as an all-in-one counter-radicalization tool 
that would remove social strains, hamper Islamists’ mobilization mechanisms, and trump their teaching of 
propagating message based on cultivated familiarity.    
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
131 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Radicalization Path,  Identity Crisis, Gradual Indoctrination, Culturing, 
Law of the Few, Stickiness Factor, Power of Context, De-radicalization, Diffusion of 
Innovation, Strengthening Family System, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Mohajiroun,  Construction of 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Major, Pakistan Army 
B.S., Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, 1992 
M.S., Baluchistan University, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 






















Professor Heather Gregg 




Dr. Gordon McCormick  
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This study examines why and how Islamists’ message of radicalization 
spread like a social contagion among UK Muslim communities during the 1990s. 
The thesis hypothesizes that a small number of Islamists, with smartly 
contextualized ideas, given a receptive environment, can spread their influence 
rapidly.  
Borrowing from Social Movement Theory and other works, this thesis 
elaborates how, through word-of-mouth and interpersonal communications, a 
relatively small number of people can successfully initiate a social epidemic of 
religious extremism. By following simple rules of marketing, Islamists made their 
message stickier.    
To counter radicalization, the study suggests a paradigm shift: instead of 
countering the Islamists on theological grounds, reinvigoration of “family” is 
proposed as an all-in-one counter-radicalization tool that would remove social 
strains, hamper Islamists’ mobilization mechanisms, and trump their teaching of 
propagating message based on cultivated familiarity.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
As I speak, terrorists are methodically and intentionally targeting 
young people and children in this country. They are radicalizing, 
indoctrinating and grooming young, vulnerable people to carry out 
acts of terrorism. This year, we have seen individuals as young as 
15 and 16 implicated in terrorist-related activity.1 
These were the warning bells being rung by Jonathan Evan (MI5 Chief) in 
a rare public speech in Manchester, England, in 2007. 
Today, people have started calling Muslims’ radicalization in the UK a bell-
weather for Europe in terms of counter-terrorism. The number of attacks in the 
UK in the last few years bears testimony to this fact: “Today, the home-grown 
terrorists in [the] UK have become a major threat. There are a growing number of 
people from the UK who are willing to carry out attacks, or who have tried, but 
failed. At the same time, support and sympathy for extremists has also been 
increasing.”2  In June 2007, the county’s threat level was raised to “critical,” the 
highest of five possible levels, meaning a terrorist attack was expected 
imminently.3  It remained “critical” for a month. Yet, once the threat level was 
reduced to “severe,” this still meant that an attack was highly likely.4 Since 2001, 
the police and security services have disrupted over a dozen attempted plots in 
 
1 Press Association, “Children Being groomed to Carry out Terrorist Attacks in Britain, Spy 
Chief Warns,” International Herald Tribune, November 5, 2007.  
2 Andrew Silke, “The Psychology of Terrorist Radicalization,” Report of a workshop on 
“Radicalization: Foresight and Warning,” organized by The Centre of Excellence for National 
Security and Global Future Forum, Singapore, 2-4 February 2008.    
3 Press Association, “Terror Threat Level Now ‘Critical,’” The Guardian, June 30, 2007. 
4 Ibid.  
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the UK.5 The problem has assumed additional importance as radicalized 
Muslims communities have become a major threat internatio
Why and how have the Muslims in the UK grown radicalized to this 
extent? There are several drivers of this home-grown terrorism. The UK’s 
domestic and foreign policies significantly contribute to it. Most terrorist recruits, 
especially second and third generation British Muslims, have felt compelled to 
support or partake in terrorist activities as a response to relative deprivation and 
social problems such as marginalization and discrimination.7 British foreign 
policy contributes to a sense of alienation among young Muslims, and this 
interacts with and reinforces domestic sources of discontent. “Specific causes 
cited were bias towards Israel vis-à-vis Palestinians; non-action on Kashmir and 
Chechnya; and ‘active oppression’ in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wid
The consequences—whether we speak in terms of terrorism, the law and 
order situation, religious extremism, or intolerance—are derivative of a process 
called “radicalization.” In this thesis, radicalization is defined narrowly as: “the 
reasons for, and the processes through which people engage in terrorist 
activities.”9 For this study, the focus will be on the process by which Muslims, or 
converts, become “radicalized”—that is, the process by which they adopt 
attributes and beliefs that later lead to direct and indirect involvement in terrorist 
activities.   
The general study of religious radicalization tends to either oversimplify 
the process by stressing single factor explanations, or to overemphasize the 
 
5 The Home Office UK, “The UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorists,” Published 
in March 2009, http://www.ProQuest.org/ (accessed April 22, 2009).  
6 “CIA Warns Barack Obama that British Terrorists are the Biggest Threat to the US,” 
Telegraph.co.uk, February 7, 2009, http://www.ProQuest.org/ (accessed December 28, 2008). 
7 Silke, “The Psychology of Terrorist Radicalization,” 8. 
8 Brendan O’Duffy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” 
Political Science & Politics, January 2008, 37. 
9 Petter Nesser, “How Does Radicalization Occur in Europe?” Presentation given at the 2nd 
Inter-Agency Radicalization Conference, hosted by US Department of Homeland Security, 
Washington DC, July 10, 2006. 
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complexity of the phenomenon and arrive at the pessimistic conclusion that it is 
impossible to identify “a typical terrorist” and typical ways of becoming a 
terrorist.10 Both of these views are too extreme. Radicalization is a process; 
individuals do not typically awake with a sudden perception that drives them to 
join a radical Islamic group. Indeed, they experience an often extensive 
socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debate and 
deliberation, and even experimentation with alternative groups. Only when an 
individual is convinced that he/she has found the group that represents the “true” 
version of Islam is he or she likely to join.11   
What causes do radical groups mobilize around, and when do these 
causes resonate for potential recruits? Social Movement Theory (SMT) offers a 
way to study the critical factors and has been applied in a number of historical 
studies of leftist and nationalist terrorism. It conceives social movements and 
their violent subgroups as rational actors, driven by an agenda and a set of 
distinct goals. Social networks, according to SMT, are the key vehicle for 
transmission of grievances, for recruitment, and for mobilization. To examine the 
process of radicalization through SMT, all structural factors, group processes, 
and individual motivations are to be linked in an integrated analytical framework. 
According to Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, this can be done by looking at different 
approaches that exist within SMT, i.e., Strain Theory, Resources Mobilization 
Theory, and Framing Theory.12  
Strain Theory typically focuses on external strains in and on society that 
create a psychological sense of isolation and impotence among the populace in 
the face of broad societal changes. Joining a social movement provides an outlet 
 
10 Nesser, “How Does Radicalization Occur in Europe?” 
11 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam,” 
http://www.ProQuest.org/ (accessed January 23, 2009). 
12 Anja Dalgaard Nielsen, “Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I – The Potential 
Contribution of Social Movement Theory,” Working Paper for Danish Institute for International 
Studies Number 2008/2, 2, http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2008/WP08-
2_Studying_Violent_Radicalization_in_Europe_I_-
_The_Potential_Contribution_of_Social_Movement_Theory.pdf  (accessed February 2, 2009). 
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and alleviates the experience of psychological strain. However, critics of this 
theory point out that a strain is only a psychological coping mechanism and is not 
always a sufficient causal factor for explaining social movements. For that, we 
bring into focus Resource Mobilization Theory, which helps us understand how 
intermediate variables translate strain and discontent into political action.13  
Resource Mobilization Theory establishes for us how movements actively 
engage in garnering support and enlarging their constituency, and how social 
networks and micro-level organizations, such as mosques, schools, and religious 
organizations, define and disseminate grievances. Resource Mobilization 
Theory’s focus on social networks as vehicles for recruitment explains some of 
the processes and the structure of a movement’s growth, but it cannot account 
for the interpersonal processes that occur once recruiters and constituents 
engage with potential recruits. Although both Strain Theory and Resource 
Mobilization Theory elaborate the causal and functional attributes of any social 
phenomenon like radicalization, one finds them unable to explain the extent to 
which movements manage to explain and promote their cause(s) in terms that  
resonate with their potential constituency. To understand these processes it is 
necessary, according to the critics, to place more emphasis on the socio-
psychological interpretation of grievances.14  
This leads us to the third approach—Framing Theory. Framing Theory 
focuses on the social production and dissemination of meaning and on how 
individuals come to conceptualize themselves as a collectivity. The concept of 
“frame” relies on the work of sociologist Erving Goffman and refers to an 
individual’s worldview or “schemata of interpretation,” consisting of values 
(notions about right and wrong) and beliefs (assumptions about the world, 
attributes of things, and mechanisms of causation). A frame helps an individual 
make sense of and organize his or her experience, and guide his or her action. 
Key to mobilization, according to this perspective, is whether the movement’s 
 
13 Nielsen, 4. 
14 Ibid., 4-5.  
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version of the “reality” resonates with or can be made to resonate for the 
movement’s potential constituency. Some scholars have referred to this process 
as “frame alignment”—the emergence of congruence between an individual’s 
and an organization’s interests, values, and beliefs.15  
Taken together, these approaches to SMT provide an effective framework 
for understanding the process of radicalization among Muslims in the UK. There 
is a common assumption that the process of radicalization started in the 1990s 
and that, within almost 10–12 years, its message had spread throughout the UK 
at quite an impressive speed. What might be those factors that helped tip off the 
Islamists’ ideas so that they proliferated so quickly? Malcolm Gladwell’s The 
Tipping Point offers a causal explanation. Borrowing from Gladwell’s three 
laws—the Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor, and the Power of Context—will 
help us dissect the process of radicalization, as well as offering insight into how 
Islamists carry out their persuasion campaign and spread their radical ideas 
among the UK’s Muslim communities. It is expected that with a more enhanced 
understanding of the radicalization process, we can better plan a more effective 
strategy to reverse the tide of radicalization, not solely by taking preventative 
measures, but also by going on the offensive and disseminating moderate ideas 
in innovative ways.    
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
The purpose of this qualitative study will be to analyze the 
proliferation/spread of radical Islamization in the British Muslim Community, 
which started around 1990 and is still alive, though there may be less fervor 
associated with it today then several years ago. Besides native Muslims, the 
thesis will consider all major Muslim diasporas in the UK. For an inductive 
analysis, Ed Husain’s The Islamist will be used as the main case study. Relevant 
input acquired about British-based Muslims will also be cited to substantiate 
findings drawn from The Islamist. In its later chapters, the thesis will examine the 
 
15 Nielsen, 6-10. 
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feasibility of reversing the tide based on a model derived in earlier chapters of the 
thesis. This research is expected to be beneficial to everyone concerned about 
radicalization.     
C. RESEARCH APPROACH  
This study will provide a conceptual framework for understanding the 
proliferation of radicalization in the Muslim community in the UK. The framework 
will be derived by using Ed Husain as an ideal type/archetype for analytical 
purposes. Common pathways identified through using his and other accounts will 
then be validated given the information available about known Muslim terrorists 
killed or apprehended in the UK.  
To evolve a counter-strategy to violent extremism, the Muslim community 
has to develop a stronger message. What is needed is an idea that not only can 
change the general mindset, but which borrows from social phenomena such as 
fashions, fads, trends, and revolutionary ideas. Malcolm Gladwell’s book, The 
Tipping Point, provides useful hints about the environment in which a message 
can tip the general mood, and how the message should be packaged and 
passed though word-of-mouth via social networks. Conceptual notions about 
spreading “new ideas” as “innovations” are borrowed from Everett M. Rogers’ 
Diffusion of Innovations.  
D. THESIS OUTLINE  
Chapter II, “A Case Study – The Islamist, How Radical Islam is Spread in 
the UK,” will discuss and analyze The Islamist. I will pay special attention to 
highlight what is so typical about Ed Husain’s case that his account can be used 
to describe pathways toward radicalization.  
Chapter III, “Modeling and Corroborating the Radicalization Path,” will 
model the generalized pathways toward radicalization. The model will be 
analyzed and supported by using information available from different studies  
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about Islamists in the UK. Chapter III pulls together a good portion of the 
literature concerning Muslim radicalization in the UK and sets the stage for the 
rest of the study.  
Chapter IV, “Proliferation of Radicalists’ Ideas in the UK,” examines the 
radicalization process through the lens of Gladwell’s theory regarding tipping 
points. In applying  Gladwell’s laws, I will be treating the proliferation of Islamists’ 
ideas as a social phenomenon. 
Chapter V, “De-radicalization and Spreading Moderate Ideas,” borrows 
from Everett M. Rogers’ theory of the “diffusion of innovation.” This chapter 
explores how we can reverse the tide of radicalization in the UK. Can we 
proliferate our ideas to support moderation and religious tolerance based on 
Gladwell’s theory of tipping points and borrowing from Rogers’ insight? 
Chapter VI, “Conclusion,” summarizes the takeaways from this study. It is 
followed by the appendix and the bibliography.   
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II. A CASE STUDY: THE ISLAMIST—HOW RADICAL ISLAM 
SPREAD IN THE UK  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The London attacks of July 2005, in which four young, apparently 
unremarkable British Muslim men killed 52 people in Western Europe's first 
suicide bombings, were followed by the incident of May 2007, in which five 
British-born Muslims were convicted of plotting to blow up targets like a shopping 
center and a nightclub using 600 kilograms of ammonium nitrate. These events 
raised a heated debate in the British press: how did the UK get to a position 
whereby MI5 has to deal with home-grown terrorism?   
Is this the result of a sense of disenfranchisement that was so common 
during the 1990s in the UK, or is it a consequence of an identity crisis, a common 
phenomenon experienced by many Muslim immigrants in London? Another 
factor that draws attention is violence against Muslims in Bosnia, Palestine, and 
Kashmir, which may have brought the religious identity problem to the forefront 
for young Muslims, setting up conditions for the radicalization of differences.  
Ed Husain’s book, The Islamist, helps us to systematically trace how the 
idea of radicalization in the UK Muslim community spread and mushroomed. As 
we will see, his home environment helped tilt his biases toward religion, where he 
found answers to his identity crisis by believing himself to be part of the global 
Muslim community. Attachment to this idea forced him to rebel against his 
parents and become a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir. He worked for the organization, 
preached its theological ideology and, in the process of “culturing” himself, 
became radicalized. Nevertheless, his intelligence and sensitivity with regard to 
what he knew to be right eventually led him to return full circle from Islamist 
alienation back to his family and tolerant mystical Islam. The real stickiness about 
Ed Husain’s personal journey is the fact that it not only offers us a potential 
pattern that, if does not fit all, at least fits most Muslims who take a path toward 
 10
                                           
radicalization, but it also reveals the broad contours of this phenomenon, giving 
us a framework through which to plan a reversal strategy.  
B. ED HUSAIN’S CHILDHOOD 
Ed Husain belonged to a lower middle class family whose founding 
members arrived in England only in 1961. His father was born in British India, his 
mother in East Pakistan; he considered himself, though born in England, an 
Indian. He was the eldest of four, with a younger brother and twin sisters. He 
received his early education from Sir William Burrough Primary School, which he 
recalls almost as an extension of his house: “the teachers would often visit my 
parents and I remember going to Ms Powlesland’s house to pick cherries in her 
garden.”16 However, he also states that growing up “British” in the 1980s was not 
easy. In East London where he lived, the atmosphere outside on the streets 
presented a sharp contrast to the warmth of home. Shaven-headed tattooed 
thugs hurling insults like, “Paki, Paki f------ off back home,” were common.17  
Ed Husain, in his childhood, was a soft-spoken kid. During his days at Sir 
William Burrough School, he experienced two incidents that left indelible 
impressions. The first incident involved one of his teachers who, while 
admonishing him, sarcastically remarked, “where is your Allah now, eh? Where is 
he? Can’t he help you?” Husain writes that, though he could not understand the 
context of these remarks even then, he made out that they had something to do 
with Islam.18 The second incident that he describes conveys an “unspoken 
appreciation of its [British] values of fairness and equality.” He was in the school 
playground when he fell off a bike and cut his chin.19 He was immediately taken 
for first aid and then to his home by another teacher, Ms. Cherie. Her gesture of 
love, care, and affection stayed permanently with Husain.  
 
16 Ed Husain, The Islamist (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 1. 
17 Ibid., 2.  
18 Ibid., 4.  
19 Ibid., 5.  
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Husain received his secondary school education at Stepney Green 
School, which was predominantly an Asian boy’s school. As he says, the “single 
reason of his admission there was his parents’ strong belief in single-sex 
education.”20 However, he personally never liked going there, hardly had friends, 
and consequently became withdrawn and very introverted. He recalls that he was 
never able to relate to most of his classmates. In general, he found school to be 
rife with incidents of indiscipline.21 
C.  RELIGIOUS HOME ENVIRONMENT  
At home, Husain belonged to an extremely close family.22 His father, while 
at home, used to listen regularly to the news and his concern with current affairs 
left a profound mark on Husain. But, his father’s intellectual preoccupations were 
not limited solely to history and politics. A key part of his life, from a very young 
age, had been religion. He was a committed follower of a famous pir, or spiritual 
master from the India-Bangladesh border region (Sylhet), named Shaikh Abd ul-
Latif.23 Husain grew up calling Shaikh Abd ul-Latif “Grandpa.” Husain used to 
accompany Shaikh Latif to different places, whenever Grandpa visited Britain. 
Husain learned at home from his father that, “spiritual seekers did not gain 
knowledge from books alone, but learned from what he called Suhbah, or 
companionship.”24  
Husain considered Grandpa’s suhbah an honor and blessing for him, as it 
made his parents proud. He was 14 years of age when he started going to dhikar 
meetings at Brick Lane Mosque, which he found very spiritual. He also 
participated in similar gatherings, called mawlid, organized at his home, where he 
 
20 Husain.  
21 Ibid., 7.  
22 Ibid., 8.  
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Ibid.  
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used to recite from the Quran before Grandpa addressed the participants.25 
Closeness to Grandpa increased Husain’s prestige not only among his peers and 
family, but in his own eyes as well. He not only learned about religion, but also 
politics under Grandpa’s influence. It was in Shaikh Latif’s company that he first 
heard individuals such as “Mawdudi” being severely criticized.26 
All this, however, did not help Husain much at school, where he remained 
even more of a misfit. But, one important thing that transpired was that his peers’ 
approval no longer mattered to him. He became resolute. His keenness to learn 
more about faith increased, and he also started taking a religious education class 
at school. The other student who joined him was Abdullah Falik. Husain 
describes that though their teacher, Mrs. Rainey, “was of the Church of England, 
[that] did not stop us from trying to convert her.”27 He categorizes this phase of 
his religious learning at school as different from the education he received at 
home. Before this, “Grandpa and my parents had taught me by setting an 
example, by living faith. Mrs. Rainey taught us with books.”28  Husain’s parents 
taught him that Islam was a path that would draw him closer to God. However, in 
books, he came across an alternate idea known as “Islamic politics”—the need 
for a state where Islam was a system of government.29 Consequently, he slowly 
started appreciating the efforts of several organizations that were dedicated to 
the creation of a truly Islamic state.  
D.  EAST LONDON MOSQUE—SEEKING NEW IDENTITY 
Husain’s friendship with Abdullah Falik also influenced him. He considered 
Falik “a better Muslim, because he was also involved with the Young Muslim 
Organization (YMO) and spent much of his spare time helping events at East 
 
25 Husain, 14.  
26 Ibid., 17. 
27 Ibid., 19. 
28 Ibid., 20. 
29 Ibid., 21. 
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London Mosque.”30 Together, Husain and Abdullah Falik started to assert a new 
identity: as young London-born Muslim students. During this transformational 
period, they looked to symbols of distinctive identity. One fad they indulged in 
was to wear a black and white checkered scarf: “Bedouin headgear conveniently 
appropriated as a symbol of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation.”31 
Sensing his parents’ disapproval, Husain withheld from them any information 
about YMO and East London Mosque. As he puts it, “had my father caught me 
snorting cocaine he would have found it in him to forgive me, counsel me. But I 
knew he would not be able to tolerate any association with those he considered 
enemies of God: Mawdudi’s followers, the activists at the East London 
Mosque.”32 
Since his childhood, Husain had always offered his prayers at Brick Lane. 
East London was considered a rival mosque. East London Mosque, throughout 
the late 1980s, had remained the site of conflict between rival factions of Jamat 
e-Islami (JI) in Britain. Husain writes that his father considered JI “a sinister 
political organization [that] use[s] Islam as a political tool and demean[s] the 
Prophet’s original teachings.”33 However, Husain’s friend, Falik, persuaded him 
to meet some people from the organization and decide for himself whether it was 
a political or a religious organization. Husain recalled that the first time he went to 
East London Mosque he felt confused, as if he was “stepping inside enemy 
territory.” However, he received VIP treatment. Everyone he met took an interest 
in him, his studies, his family, and his future. He writes that he felt comfortable 
among them as “I [he] could relate to them…they seemed like worthy role 
models: English-speaking, educated, and rooted in faith.”34  
 
30 Husain, 23.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid., 24. 
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Back at school, Husain and Falik stopped visiting Mrs. Rainey, who was 
sidelined by family commitments. Instead, they spent more time at the East 
London Mosque, hanging out with Muslims from YMO and Islamic Forum 
Europe. Husain started to attend meetings at the Fieldgate street offices of YMO. 
During those meetings he became familiar with the organization and its leaders.  
Among those who influenced him most was an individual named Siraj, a 
Bangladeshi who gave him small gifts and memorabilia: “as a youth worker he 
[Siraj] acted as my mentor…As weeks passed by he gave me lifts home and took 
an interest in those I loved most: my parents.”35 However, no one tried to openly 
recruit Husain into the YMO. 
Until then, Husain’s parents did not know about his activities at YMO. To 
convince his parents that YMO was all right, Husain sought Siraj’s help. He 
asked Siraj about JI’s motives but, to his surprise and satisfaction, Siraj adopted 
on “open door policy” and criticized Mawdudi. He said, “we don’t consider 
Mawdudi a perfect [sic], he made mistakes. You can disagree with Mawdudi, and 
yet join the Islamic movement.”36 By then, Husain also started participating in 
YMO promotion activities: producing T-shirts, putting up posters in Muslim areas 
of London, and persuading parents to encourage their children to attend YMO 
events. He also joined YMO taleemi jalsa, which was organized in a large hall 
adjoining the mosque. About 50 young men sat on the floor in a rough circle, with 
two men serving as discussion leaders. The speakers were mostly young 
undergraduates (young undergraduates were a rarity in Tower Hamlets where 
Husain lived). Participating in such activities began to give Husain a sense of 
accomplishment, “Falik and I were now openly known as brothers from YMO. 
After 5 years, I had found both a friend and a cause to which I belonged.”37 
At the weekly taleemi jalsas, a main focus of the talks was, “Islam is a 
source of all knowledge. Before Islam the world was in darkness. Today, the 
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west is proud of democracy, but where did it come from? The first democracy in 
the world was in Medina, when the Muslims elected caliphs in free elections.”38 
Husain describes how this unquestioning assertion of Islam’s, or more precisely 
Islamists’, political superiority over the west, stayed with him. At YMO another 
theme was “striving together to create a true Islamic society in the world.”39 Yet 
another compelling theme was based on Mawdudi’s conviction that the struggle 
for removing disbelieving rulers and creating a society ruled by “the rightness” 
was the only “means left to please God.”40  
Besides the jalsas, there were also certain mandatory readings for all 
Islamist movement activists. YMO provided Husain with a daily routine with a 
host of activities that he had to report on everyday: the number of prayers he had 
read in congregation at a mosque, how much of the Quran he had recited, how 
many pages of Islamic books he had read, how much time he had spent with 
family, and how many hours he had targeted for recruitment. At the taleemi jalsa, 
the individual who had accomplished the most during the preceding week was 
publicly praised.41  
At the age of 16, Husain had no white friends. His world was entirely 
Asian, fully Muslim. Nor was he a mere Muslim, like all the others he knew; he 
was better, superior. While his fellow teenagers were smuggling pornography 
into their rooms, his contraband consisted of books written by Islamist 
ideologues. However, these were also testy times for Husain, as his parents 
were becoming seriously concerned about his sudden outburst of religious fervor. 
During this period, YMO members comforted him by saying, “this is the way God 
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Husain’s father did engage him in long hours of debate and sermons, but 
by then he had become a staunch activist. Though he curtailed his activities for a 
time, he still maintained his daily routine sheet, and read bulletins issued by the 
JI. At one point his father gave him the ultimatum: “leave Mawdudi’s Islamism or 
leave my house.”43 Husain decided to leave his family.  
Husain turned to the mosque for support, which he received. In describing 
his feelings he writes, “deep down I wanted to go home, but that would be seen 
as backing down in the face of parental pressure. I had to win. The Islamist 
movement must prevail.”44 His intransigence succeeded, and after a few days, 
his parents forgave him on his terms: he was free to do as he pleased. 
Henceforth, with his parents defeated, there was no one to stop him. 
E.  ISLAMIST ACTIVISM AND DAWA 
Readings and discussions inside the mosque and at various meetings 
were not just about abstract concepts. There were prescribed readings by 
Mawdudi and Syed Qutb. In the writings they read, Mawdudi advocates gradual 
change and is even, on occasion, ready to make concessions to the West. In 
contrast, Qutb preaches an all-out war. The bottom line for Islamists, Husain 
discovered, was a popular phrase borrowed from the Muslim Brotherhood, “Islam 
is the solution”—“al-Islam huwa al-hall.” To ordinary Muslims, this had a certain 
resonance. The stories of martyrdom that reached them from Afghanistan about 
jihad against the Soviets helped them feel connected.   
In short, Husain and his new friends learned how to deploy religion to 
manipulate the emotions of their fellow Muslims. At Tower Hamlets College, for 
instance, a group of student Islamists came up with the idea of organizing high 
profile events at the main campus.45 The advertising technique they adapted was 
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45 Husain was attending Tower Hamlet College at this time. He became very active as 
member of the College Islamic Society. Very quickly, based on his dedication by a secret ballot 
he was selected president. Ibid., 59. 
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the same one used by automobile manufacturers when launching a new model: 
initially the product was hidden beneath a white sheet, and only slowly unveiled 
before a curious public. Curiosity made fliers about the “Islamic society” a subject 
of conversation in every class. The provocative posters Husain and his fellow 
Islamists made caused an uproar on campus. However, this too, worked for 
them; their student event, billed as the largest in the college’s history, was a 
phenomenal success.  
As society president, Husain headed a 10-member committee, which met 
once a week, planned events, and then critically evaluated the successes and 
failures of every gathering. He and the committee ran the Islamic Society like a 
military operation.46 They had a chain of command and a clear vision of where 
they were headed. Husain was by then promoting Islamism every day—at 
college, in his private life, and in public with the YMO. As a student president, he 
also had frequent meetings with the senior YMO President and through him 
received instructions from YMO headquarters.  
Husain’s area of responsibility for dawa was Tower Hamlets College. 
Husain devised a strategy for recruitment of new students. Every new entrant 
was welcomed, and with their very first contact, received literature. Husain and 
his supporters also started extending help to students who came to them with 
their problems. Throughout the college, Husain and his circle, were viewed as 
activists who knew what they were doing in life.  
Slowly, YMO became aggressive in its outlook. It demanded and received 
a room for prayers in college, which it used for organizing and rallying Muslim 
students. As YMO grew in strength, Husain and his fellow leaders started 
blackmailing the college management. Similarly, they stopped Muslims students 
from going to discos, not by force but by playing on their sensitivities of guilt, 
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shame and humiliation. Consequently, within six months YMO had effectively 
changed the entire atmosphere of the college.47  
Commenting on the social ethos among Britain’s young Muslims, Husain 
explains, “the more extroverted we became in our perceived expression of Islam, 
the more highly valued we were among our peers.”48 YMO did intellectually 
manipulate certain teachings. For example, “courting and dating” were 
considered morally degenerate. Therefore, most YMO members found partners 
of the opposite gender under the pretext of marriage. Knowing that a strict ban 
on this might reduce recruitment, the YMO activists cited scripture from early 
Islam to prove that a suitor could approach a potential partner directly, agree to 
the terms of agreement, and then ask a woman’s parents for her hand in 
marriage.49  
F.  QUEST FOR PURE ISLAM AND DAYS IN HIZB UT-TAHRIR 
In order to propagate YMO’s ideas Husain, as president of the student 
YMO, arranged for good pubic speakers. “We invited them [speakers from JMAS 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir] often because they were mostly dynamic speakers, able to 
stir a crowd and plant genuine interest in Islam.”50 These speakers not only 
came to talk, but also flooded the college with books, which preached Wahabi
Husain noticed that, under the influence of Wahabism, several of his 
fellow students headed to Afghanistan for jihad training in response to Quranic 
verses urging Muslims to rise up against violence.51 In early 1993, the Balkans 
crisis added fuel to people’s hatred of the West. Videos depicting the ethnic 
cleansing of Bosnian Muslims had a great impact on the students. They started 
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51 Ibid., 73. 
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eely determination, as this was 
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collecting money in order to help the victims but very quickly moved to the idea of 
jihad as a simplified answer to the slaughter. During this period, Husain writes 
that he began to become disgruntled with the YMO due to its preoccupation with 
only the Bangladeshi community, its lack of intellectual vigor, and its complete 
failure to provide an answer to the Bosnian issue.52 Husain was clearly not 
 
The organization that hijacked the situation, Husain says, was Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Hizb’s membership quickly grew; it had a clear methodology for dealing 
with all of the problems of the world. From Bosnia to the Gulf War, from the 
poverty in Africa to the high crime rate in the West, it offered solutions. Unlike 
YMO, Hizb likewise claimed, “If there was an Islamic state, a caliphate, then 
Bosnia would have not happened.”53 Hizb promised, “[to] redistribute the wealth 
of the future Islamic State.” Not only did Hizb step up its activities during the 
Bosnian war, but TV news bulletins—200,000 people lost their lives in the 
conflict, millions more were made homeless—reinforced its message. Given such 
an environment of 
menal effect.  
It was mostly the second-generation British Muslims and converts who 
were seduced by Omar Bakri, also known as the “Tottenham Ayatollah.” His 
mastery of the Arabic language and his ready and seemingly relevant quotes 
from the Quran and other sources attracted the young British Muslims. Moreover, 
a particularly effective stratagem used by Hizb ut-Tahrir was to convince its 
members that “working towards establishing an Islamic State is an Islamic 
obligation, at par with daily prayers and Hajj.”54 Impressed by Omar Bakri’s 
speeches and practical solutions to the Bosnian conflict, Husain decided to join 
Hizb. Hizb targeted Tower Hamlets with a st
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Hizb leaders accused JI and the Muslim Brotherhood of having strayed 
from the ideas set out in Qutb’s Milestone.55 Hizb’s scripture was based on 
teachings by Nabhani, who argued for complete destruction of the existing 
political order, and its replacement by the Khilafat system. To achieve this, Hizb 
preached a three-part strategy aimed at taking political power: secret stage, open 
stage, and nusrrat [victory]. As Husain got inside Hizb, he realized it was more 
secretive than he assumed with numerous cells of 5–8 members each.56 He 
used to get a telephone call that would tell him who his mushrif was for the 
halaqah of the coming weekly gathering.  
During the halaqah discussions, Hizb members never discussed trivial 
things. Their seriousness and commitment to the cause were judged by the level 
of sophistication and content of their questions. In fact, there was a group culture 
inside Hizb that no question should be asked unless it was relevant to their global 
aims. There was likewise a built-in culture of aggressive argumentation: “Never 
defend, always offend.”57 Hizb members challenged the ideas of every other 
Muslim group, and even bullied speakers to adopt their arguments or face 
confrontation.   
From 1992 to 1993, Hizb was given excessive coverage in the print 
media. As Husain writes, “nothing gave them [Hizb members] greater motivation 
than to hear our ideas being amplified in the national media, reaching new 
audiences of Muslims.”58 Hizb numbers increased steadily as they attacked the 
West. Their leaflets cited the worst aspects of the West’s social freedoms, its 
financial systems, and political immorality. All were evidence of the West’s 
coming decline. Activists’ discussion strategy was to obliterate Western ideas 
that controlled peoples’ behavior or influenced their psyche and then supplant 
these with new ideas: Hizb ideas. Hizb addressed problems commonly 
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confronted by youth, such as ‘sex, drugs and rock n roll,’ race, and marriage 
(whether arranged or by love). During summer vacations, Hizb activities did not 
cease. Instead, when students returned to their homes, they were supposed to 
take Hizb concepts and ideas with them into the Muslim community.  
At one stage, Omar Bakri was delivering as many as 29 lectures a week, 
both in private and public. However, unlike organizing in universities, mobilizing 
whole communities proved to be a more difficult task.59 Activists were taught not 
to create a false sense that something had been achieved, especially since the 
achievement they were striving for was a radical shift in perception. Their goal 
was to politicize Muslim public opinion, to reconnect the Ummah, and forge it into 
one nation; the unfinished business of Vienna in 1683, when the Ottomans tried 
and failed to conquer Europe, had to be completed.  
To take their ideas to the wider Muslim community, Hizb activists did just 
as they had done on campus. They avoided the name of Hizb ut-Tahrir, instead 
calling themselves the Muslim Unity Organization and launching local 
demonstrations across the UK to whip up Muslim fears: “Bosnia today, Britain 
tomorrow.” They also tried to inculcate a sense of failing the Ummah on the part 
of Britain’s relatively well-off Muslims, who saw themselves as remote from the 
problems of the Arab and Muslim world. They developed friendships with gangs 
of Muslim youth who hung out on street corners in the evenings. Hizb clerics like 
Omar Bakri also tried to drive a wedge between Muslims and the law. Within a 
decade, his policy of non-cooperation with Kafir legislation set many Islamists 
against the British police.  
To maximize their influence, Hizb activists tried to gain access to regular 
Friday crowds at local community mosques. Often they were denied this 
privilege, as other organizations had already established their hold. Hizb 
responded with an innovation: if not allowed to speak inside the mosque, they 
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should canvass outside the mosque after Friday prayers.60 Besides this, they 
also held demonstrations that would take them past major mosques in selected 
Muslims areas.61 Throughout this process, the media gave Hizb much needed 
coverage. Other venues where Hizb hunted for ready-made crowds were Tabligi 
Jamaat weekly gatherings. There people came from across Britain. Hizb was 
able to make contacts and send them back to other cities buzzing with Hizb’s 
ideas.  
In other parts of the country, Hizb activists entered mosques through two 
avenues: as young Muslims returning from universities on break, wanting to talk 
about Islam, or through personal contacts they had among their large network of 
Asian “uncles,” the Beraderi. Typically, the activists avoided elders and targeted 
instead the “junior followers in jeans and T-shirts.” 62 
G.  APPROACHING FANATICISM  
After a few years, Husain decided to move to Newham. Newham had an 
altogether different environment. It had a large Muslim population, but also a 
liberal smattering of people of other faiths, particularly Sikhs and Hindus. Dawa 
stalls were first used by Hizb there. On Saturday mornings, and occasionally at 
large meetings of other groups, the activists put up their table and displayed 
some of their most controversial leaflets, along with tapes inviting people to their 
meetings.63    
As he moved to Newham, Husain’s halaqah also changed. His new 
halaqah involved students from top universities in London. His mushrif, Amir 
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talked about the “system of Islam” and discussed the constitution of the Islamic 
state, as they were convinced that very shortly there would be an announcement 
of the establishment of an Islamic state.  
During this period, Husain began having doubts about where Islamists 
were heading.64 He wondered whether the original Islamic political system was 
only a myth. In Nabhani’s so-called constitution, several articles under the 
section entitled “the social system,” looked problematic. Most importantly, women 
were forbidden to be in private with any man they might marry. He found this 
contrary to what most of the activists were doing. Slowly, as he started 
developing these doubts, Husain also observed that under peer pressure his 
freedom to ask questions was being limited. Nevertheless, he continued with 
Hizb.  
In 1994, Hizb planned to emphasize a different theme. The previous year 
it had held demonstrations to attract attention to Bosnia, but this time Hizb 
activists were going to publicize an international conference to mark the official 
ending of the Ottoman Empire, which they referred to as the “Destruction of the 
Islamic State.” They started advertising early, seven months before the 
conference. They tried to create intense media interest in the event with 
billboards like, “Coming soon to a Country near You.” They put Khilafat stickers 
everywhere, prompting people to ask what kilafat was? Who was putting up the 
stickers?  
Hizb activities started this campaign from known community centers, 
leafleted mosques, and sold tickets to their friends, families and neighbors.65 
Mohammad al-Masari, a famous Saudi dissident, whom the British government 
wanted to deport, was wheeled out at a press conference to give the impression 
that something big was about to happen in the Middle East. They also used the 
conference to launch English translations of Nabhani’s books, particularly his 
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revisionist historic book The Islamic State. But the conference, once it came, was 
a failure: Hizb received lot of media coverage, but attendance was minimal.  
During this time, Husain developed a friendship with Majid Nawaz, who 
joined him at Newham for his A-Levels. Husain observed that, unlike him, Majid 
gained popularity very quickly and attributed this to his fashionable clothes, 
attitude, good looks, and street talk. Majid recruited contacts and made members 
of friends he met at the college canteen or even in the college library. Newham 
College had no prayer room, so Husain, Majid, and others used this fact to 
mobilize students, saying: “They slaughter us in Bosnia, expel us from our homes 
in Palestine, and refuse us a basic right to pray in Britain.”66 As Hizb became 
popular at other college campuses, Newham community started taking an 
interest in what Hizb extremists were teaching. “We could, at an hour’s notice, 
gather a crowd of nearly a hundred at the main gate of the college.”67  
Husain also met Saeed, a lanky black Brit who considered himself a 
macho man. Saeed told everyone that in case any Kafir messed with them to call 
him for help. Externally, Husain continued to exhibit signs of piety in order to 
maintain his standing among his target audience, but he was not an observant 
Muslim. On the personal level, he began to feel that his relationship with God had 
started to deteriorate.68 Husain began to see that those canvassing on behalf of 
Islam, like Saeed, knew very little about the Quran. Husain felt that, “My life was 
consumed by fussy, inner confusion, a desire to dominate everything, and my 
abject failure to be a good Muslim. I started out on this journey wanting more 
Islam and ended up losing its essence.”69  
During this time, Husain also developed a friendship with a Muslim girl 
named Faye. He found he and Faye shared the same heritage and social 
background, had a common interest in learning Arabic, and had a similar desire 
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to travel. He also saw that Faye was closer to God: she prayed regularly. When 
Husain proposed marriage to her, her condition to him was that they first 
complete their studies and pursue their careers. His friendship with Faye uplifted 
him from within.  
One afternoon, an event happened that changed everything for Husain. A 
row developed between Christian Nigerians and Muslims over a pool table at the 
college. One of the Nigerians said offensive things and a Muslim student phoned 
Saeed, who turned up on the scene in no time. Saeed and the Nigerian 
confronted each other outside and the quarrel ended with Saeed thrusting his 
knife in the boy’s chest. Perhaps he did this in self-defense, but he ended up 
murdering the boy nonetheless. Husain and Majid approached Omar Bakri to 
explain that Saeed had acted in self-defense and asked him to stand beside the 
College’s Muslims. Instead Hizb issued a condemnation of what had happened, 
saying that Hizb was a non-violent party to the incident.  
This incident had a great effect on Husain, who wrote “that murder, a 
direct result of Hizb ut-Tahrir‘s idea, served as a wake up call for me.”70 
H. DISENCHANTMENT WITH RADICALISTS’ VIEW   
Just as Husain had become a member of Hizb over a period of time, his 
departure from the organization did not occur on a specified date. First, he 
dissociated himself from the halaqah. This was prompted by the taking of an 
innocent life, Omar Bakri’s subsequent deceit, and Husain’s horror when he 
realized how poisonous was the atmosphere he had helped create. He was 
frightened by where this all might lead. 
Husain began to wonder whether Islam had anything at all to offer. He 
feared he had completely confused Islamism with Islam: to him they were one 
and the same. To find out what in actuality Islam meant, he decided to learn 
Arabic, but also feared that he would be taking steps that Islamists typically took: 
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going directly to the divine text without scholarly guidance, believing that with the 
mere understanding of language he could interpret what Muslim scholars had 
debated and discussed for centuries. “Indoctrination of Hizb was powerful and it 
was many years before I [Husain] was completely free of it.”71  
Husain also switched universities. At the University of North London, he 
was helped by a British historian, Professor Denis Judd, in resolving some of his 
doubts about extremism. What struck him most was that professor Judd, despite 
being a non-Muslim, never expressed enmity or animosity toward Islam and 
Muslims. At this University, Husain also discovered that much of what Nabhani 
and Mawdudi had preached was in fact their own interpretation of Islam 
influenced by Marx, Hegel, and Rousseau. This revelation not only toppled 
Nabhani from his pedestal, but with him fell all of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s claims of 
political purity, intellectual superiority, deep thoughts, and the dressing up in 
religious terms of a political agenda born in the Middle East of the 1950s.  
In his quest to learn more about his religion, Husain joined evening Arabic 
classes. There he came across another individual, Zahid Amin, an activist in the 
Islamic Society of Britain (ISB). One of ISB’s major attractions for Husain was its 
vehement stance against Hizb. As with the talemmi jalsa of YMO and the 
halaqah of Hizb, ISB had evening gatherings called usrah, which in Arabic 
means “family,” an idea borrowed from the Muslim Brotherhood. The usrah 
started with a recitation from the Quran, followed by commentary, a discussion 
about what everyone had read, and a meal. Husain’s usrah instructor was Abu 
Luqman, a Palestinian, trained by Sheikh Yasin and a member of Hamas. 
Despite knowing all this, Husain continued to attend. He was now leading a 
different kind of double life: “In private, he was a free thinker. Among Islamists he 
was a brother.”72  
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ISB proudly claimed that the UK considered it their gravest Islamist threat. 
Though Husain recognized that Islamists’ inherent desire to confront and control 
also lurked within ISB, he did note some differences between it and Hizb. For 
instance, he listened to a speech by Hamza Yousaf Hanson who, in response to 
one question, went as far as to declare that there was “no such thing as an 
Islamic State.”73 Husain liked Hamza Yousaf’s courage and his willingness to 
stand up for traditional Islam when every other Muslim organization had become 
dominated by the need to establish a “state.” Nevertheless, over time he 
disassociated himself from them, too.  
Increasingly, Husain wanted to lead a normal life. He voted in the 1997 
elections and joined the Labor Party. He also applied for and got a job at HSBC. 
His hard work there earned him a good reputation, and he quickly started 
receiving promotions and raises. Islamism became a distant memory, as he 
busily built his career with no time for the underworld of mosques and marches; 
Bosnia seemed irrelevant.74  
However, after a couple of years at HSBC, Husain again felt 
uncomfortable with the environment. Three questions that he learned in Hizb 
came back to him: Why am I here? Where am I heading? Where did I come 
from? Husain no longer believed in a God who wanted man to govern in his 
name. For him, God was beyond gender, limitation, and even conceptualization. 
He felt that God had been belittled by organized religion, particularly by literalist 
extremists of all persuasions. He admitted that “I was in search of spiritual 
solace, a meaning of my life, and whoever offered it would win my 
commitment.”75  
Husain’s retreat was at once selfish and selfless, designed to benefit both 
himself and others. During this period, he vowed to commit himself generously to 
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the Quran. He turned towards tasawwaf or Sufism. He was increasingly 
motivated by the notion of turning inward, and attempted to cleanse his heart of 
feelings of anger, enmity, arrogance, envy, rancor, jealousy, and other vices that 
Sufis indicate distance humans from the truth and put us in conflict with creation.  
Without a pure heart, worship is burdensome and tiring. Sufi-oriented 
scholars helped Husain anchor his soul after five years of political Islamism—
which he increasingly viewed as a shallow, anger-ridden, aggression-fuelled form 
of political belief based on exploiting Islam’s adherents, but remote from Islam’s 
teachings. In Sufism, he finally found both hope and faith: “Islamism had now 
been completely flushed out me.”76   
I. FINDINGS   
1. Identity Crisis 
a) Ed Husain, right from his childhood, suffered from an identity dilemma. 
His father was an Indian, mother a Bangladeshi, and he himself was born British.  
b) Although the environment in which he was brought up displayed 
discriminatory tendencies, Husain recalls very little of these mainly due to his 
protected surroundings characterized by his parents and English teachers. 
Nevertheless, as he grew older he started noticing negative British attitudes 
toward Asians.  
c) He remained within the Asian community and had no British friends 
during secondary school.  
2. Home Environment and Initial Religious Grooming 
a)  At home, Husain belonged to an extremely close family. His parents 
were extra-religious. They followed a spiritual master from “home” whom they 
greatly respected. One can get an indication of their respect from the fact that 
 
76 Husain, 199. 
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Husain’s parents asked him to call Shaikh Abdul-Latif “Grandpa,” which is 
definitely not a common practice. The concept of religious mentor was in fact 
introduced to him at home. Over the next several years, Ed Husain developed a 
close association with Shaikh Latif.  
b) At the age of 14, Husain started attending evening meetings that he 
found very spiritual. As a boy who was finding it difficult to adjust among his 
peers, we could say he sought comfort in these religious gatherings. Husain 
writes that his closeness to Grandpa increased his prestige not only among his 
peers and family, but in his own eyes.  
c) Another significant thing that happened during this period was Husain’s 
awareness of selected world affairs. Since childhood, he had observed his 
father’s interest in world affairs, but he himself started taking an interest in 
current events at the age of 16 when Shaikh Latif asked him to monitor the First 
Gulf War. During this period, he started to realize non-Muslims’ persecution/ill 
treatment of Muslims, and this left an indelible mark on him. Ed Husain writes 
that his parents taught him that Islam was a path that would draw him closer to 
God. As he developed a growing interest in religion, he volunteered for religious 
studies at school. He learned about religion through the available literature, 
which introduced him to “political Islam.” 
3. Recruitment and Activities at YMO 
a) Husain was put on a religious path by his parents, but as he grew he 
tried to be more independent. He was introduced to the YMO through his friend 
Falik.  
b) Despite knowing that his parents would object, he went to the East 
London Mosque. He writes that he felt comfortable among members of YMO 
because he could relate to them and they looked, to him, to be worthy role 
models: English-speaking, educated, and rooted in faith. Until that time, his intent 
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was simple—to be the best among his colleagues. At school, he started to lead 
prayers and became actively involved in YMO activities. 
c) Here Husain’s contact with Siraj gives us some insight into how YMO 
attracts recruits. The first thing that enabled Husain to trust Siraj was the fact that 
Siraj was a Bangladeshi. Siraj gave Husain gifts and took an interest in his 
family, but never openly tried to recruit Husain. Siraj’s prime modus operandi was 
to agitate Husain’s mind through discussions and then give him religious 
literature that would mold Husain’s mind. Meanwhile, Husain also joined YMO 
promotional activities, which included putting up posters and persuading parents 
to encourage their children to attend YMO events. As Husain undertook these 
small steps, he unwittingly grew more rigid in what he thought was right. 
d) YMO also provided a different forum in the form of taleemi jalsa, where 
recruits would gather to discuss their activities. This was organized in such a way 
that Husain’s involvement gave him a growing sense of accomplishment. 
Taleemi jalas was not an abstract activity; the organization ensured that in all 
these meetings, the activists were being indoctrinated with certain themes: e.g., 
Islam is the source of all knowledge; the concept of democracy came from Islam; 
it is time for all Muslims to strive together to create a true Islamic society in the 
world; as a community Muslims must endeavor to remove disbelieving rulers; 
and, the Islamist movement must prevail.  
e) At YMO, Husain was indoctrinated with certain specific religious 
teachings of Mawdudi and Syed Qutb that presented an Islamic manifesto—
Islam is the solution. Husain and his colleagues deployed such phrases to 
manipulate the emotions of other followers. To ordinary Muslims, these phrases 
had a special resonance. 
f) YMO promotion techniques followed typical commercial practices: e.g., 
create curiosity and provoke people to think about the issue and, only at a later 
stage, present a simplified solution. YMO activists advertised in targeted Muslim  
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areas and selected universities. Good public speakers were invited for talks that 
stirred the already curious crowd and planted a genuine interest in them about 
Islam.  
g) YMO had predesignated areas for canvassing. Activists were 
encouraged to live in those communities and influence people by their personal 
example. However, during these influence campaigns activists kept in mind the 
cultural sensitivities of people, such as, “the more extrovert you become in your 
perceived expression of Islam, the more highly valued you were among your 
peers”.77 
h) To ensure their teachings resonated among the masses, the YMO 
activists often used the declining condition of Muslims worldwide for justification. 
The Balkan crisis of 1993 provided an opportunity through which most of these 
organizations made many gains. Videos showing the ethnic cleaning of Muslims 
had an especially powerful impact on the students. In fact, it even affected 
Husain, who fell victim to his own devices and left YMO to join Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
4. Hizb ut-Tahrir—A Step Ahead in Seeking Religion 
a) Husain’s stay inside YMO taught him almost all the essential 
techniques that the Islamists employed for recruitment. What distinguished Hizb 
is that its members always had answers to Husain’s questions. Hizb was also 
more secretive and activists operated in small cells. Like taleemi jalsa in YMO, 
Hizb had halqah. However, discussion in halqahs never involved trivial things. 
Members considered themselves leaders who would help bring about the 
emergence of a Muslim State, which was just a matter of time. 
b) Hizb was also media savvy. It often tried to come up with controversial 
comments that would get it media coverage. Husain writes that, while in Hizb, 
nothing gave members greater motivation than to hear their ideas being amplified 
in the national media, reaching a new audience of Muslims. 
 
77 Husain, 67. 
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c) Hizb discussion strategy was to obliterate ideas that controlled people’s 
behavior and supplant these with new ideas. At the organized talks, Hizb 
projected itself as having a much higher intellectual caliber than JI, YMO, or 
Islamic Forum Europe. The thing that impressed Husain the most was that 
whatever questions he asked, Hizb members always had answers. It addressed 
problems experienced by youth and used youth as its messengers who could 
then take its concepts into the Muslim community. British university campuses 
have been a fertile ground for this concept. 
d) Unlike in the universities, Hizb found it very difficult to mobilize whole 
Muslim communities. Hizb tried to do this by creating a false sense among the 
masses that something was about to happen.  
e) To avoid any backlash, Hizb operated under fake names like Muslim 
Unity Organization. These organizations held demonstrations, rallies, lectures 
and developed relationships with local Muslim gangs.  
f) Hizb clerics tried to drive a wedge between Muslims and the British law. 
In Muslim areas where they were denied access to mosques, activists distributed 
leaflets, creating an atmosphere of activity and radicalism by flooding the streets 
just outside the mosques with their supporters.  
g) Same Hizb activists, like Majid Nawaz, were able to gain popularity and 
make contacts due to their fashionable clothing, attitudes, good looks, and street 
talk. 
h) Hizb took advantage of all inter-personal and word-of-mouth contacts it 
had available to it.  
5. Expectation Unfulfilled—De-radicalization   
a) After staying in Hizb, Husain left for the same reasons he had joined—
to ardently follow a more religious path and seek bounty from God. After 
spending some time in Hizb, Husain started to feel his life had been consumed 
by fussy, inner confusion and a desire to dominate everything. He despised 
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himself for appearing pious and upright in Muslims’ eyes, when all the while he 
knew that there was a vacuum in his soul where God should be. 
b) Though he has confessed that the main reason for his dissatisfaction 
with Hizb was his friendship with Faye, a Bangladeshi girl who asked him leave 
this path and pursue his career for a brighter future, Husain finally left Hizb after 
realizing that Hizb was propelling him toward violence.  
c) Nevertheless, his de-radicalization also took place slowly. He slowly 
and gradually realized that all Islamist teachings are, in fact, products of their 
time and Islamists’ claims of intellectual purity are false.  
d) After leaving Hizb, Husain wondered how to lead a normal life. He had 
only a vague idea that his motives were not intellectual, political, or even 
particularly religious. His motives were introspective—for the good of his soul. He 
finally found solace among Sufi-oriented scholars: a form of Islam that he first 
learned in his childhood. During his transformation, his family, especially his 
mother and wife, provided him much needed comfort and support. Their 
eagerness to share with Husain his latest discoveries and insights helped him 
completely flush Islamism out of his system.      
J.  CONCLUSION 
Ed Husain’s demarche presents a clear account of how the radicalization 
process occurs at least for some. Notwithstanding the extent to which he has (or 
has not) narrated the incidents correctly, the book anecdotally describes how 
young Muslims can be attracted toward extremist thoughts. Can we generalize 
from the major findings listed above a definite methodology for Islamist 
recruitment and indoctrination of young Muslims? Is Husain an archetype? Does 
his joining tell us anything about the extent to which his path can be said to be 
common across Muslims in the UK? 
While Husain speaks with authority and nuance, and offers an insider’s 
view of the context that helps proliferate the Islamists’ ideology, his is not the 
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definitive account. In order to validate his experience, we at least have to take 
into account other studies and literature about Muslim radicalization in Britain.    
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III. MODELLING AND CORROBORATING THE 
RADICALIZATION PATH 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter discussed The Islamist as a case study, highlighting 
the pathways towards radicalization. The details about the proliferation of 
radicalization remained limited to what Ed Husain experienced during his journey 
as an Islamist.  
In this chapter, the generalized pathways towards radicalization will be 
corroborated with the help of other literature available on the subject. 
Radicalization is a sequential process. Though scholars and researchers have 
identified different ways in which people become engaged in religious militancy, 
there are some clear patterns that can help us explain why and how people 
become attracted to radicalization.  
For this chapter, I will adopt Marc Sageman’s thesis, which he has 
elaborated on in his book Leaderless Jihad. Sageman writes that there are three 
ways to study the process of radicalization: focus on the individual and his 
background; or, search for “root causes” in the social conditions; or, concentrate 
on how people in groups influence each other to become terrorists.78 Though 
Sageman prefers the third approach, saying, “it offers the most fruitful way to 
understanding the process of radicalization,”79 I differ from him and take into 
consideration all three bits to describe the intricate mosaic of radicalization.  
 




                                           
I do, however, adopt his suggested level of analysis for studying the 
concept of radicalization: the middle-range level analysis.80   
This chapter begins by discussing in detail the reasons for 
seclusion/exclusion of British Muslim communities. It highlights how different 
incidents adversely affect Muslims’ perceptions, reinforcing their belief that they 
are at war with the UK government, or that the UK government is at war with 
them. The chapter maps out the radicalization process in four stages. It argues 
that initial receptivity to religious seeking among UK Muslims is a direct result of 
an identity crisis. The state triggers a cognitive opening, making individuals 
vulnerable to outside influences. Cloaked in their new “Islamic identity,” Muslims 
suffer a sense of moral outrage at apparent injustices against all Muslims, both 
globally and locally. This becomes a central theme, as outside influences 
resonate with their personal experiences of discrimination. From here begins the 
process of recruitment through gradual indoctrination, which marks the second 
stage. Social bonds play a critical role at this stage and sometimes precede 
ideological commitments. Next, the third stage involves a process of activism, 
when the fully indoctrinated individual undergoes a replication process by 
spreading and passing on his convictions to others to whom he has links. 
Progression along this path carries the individual to fanaticism, the acme of 
radicalization—the final stage. A graphic representation of this journey is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
80 Sageman lists three levels of analysis: the micro-level, which focuses on terrorists; the 
macro-level, which focuses on the environment; and the middle-range analysis, which bridges the 
gap between micro and macro approaches and examines how terrorists act on the ground. 
Sageman, 13-23. 
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Figure 1.   MODELLING THE RADICALIZATION PATH 
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These four stages of radicalization will be substantiated and studied with 
the help of the three approaches of Social Movement Theory described at the 
start of Chapter I. Strain Theory helps explain how domestic grievances and 
international predicaments generate a permanent state of crisis. Resource 
Mobilization Theory describes the mechanics involved in the next three stages of 
radicalization. During this entire process, the interpersonal subjective and 
communicative processes of framing a situation/issue/problem reveal the utility of 
the Framing Theory.      
B. STAGE—I: CRISES 
1. Predicaments of Muslim Communities in the UK 
a. Muslim Ghettos   
The UK is home to 1.6 million Muslims out of a British population of 
nearly 60 million, according to the UK’s 2001 Census.81 The majority of Muslims 
in the UK have their roots in Britain’s former colonial territories of Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and India. The UK’s labor shortages and immigration policies in the 
1950s and 1960s attracted numerous Muslim workers from these countries. 
Other Muslims in the UK hail from the Middle East and African countries, as well 
as Turkey. Muslims are the largest religious minority in the UK; 46 percent of all 
Muslims living in the UK are British-born.82  
British Muslims have dwelled and established themselves in certain 
areas over a period of time. For instance, during my interviews in Bradford, I 
came across a Pakistani who had lived there for the last 35 years; he said, “when 
I moved in here, there was only one other family of Asians on the street. But now, 
 
81 Some experts believe that the UK’s Muslim population may be as high as 2 million, if 
undocumented asylum-seekers or illegal immigrants are added to the government’s official 
figures. Paul Gallis et al, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Politics in Selected Countries,” 
Congressional Research Service Report, Order Code RL 33166, November 18, 2005, Committee 
Print, 10. 
82 Ibid.  
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over the course of 35 years, it’s mainly Asians. This community is more 
traditional, like back home, Pakistan.”83 One hears much the same story in East 
London, which has a Bangladeshi majority, or in Finsbury, which is 
predominantly Arab. Elsewhere in the UK, Birmingham and Manchester are well 
known for their Asian Muslim enclaves.  
One can only understand how tightly knit and closed these 
societies are if one gets a chance to visit them. They have their own food shops, 
mosques, schools, and recreational spots. Among these, the two social 
institutions that cast a dominant influence over the community are mosques and 
schools. Both are interlinked. As an Imam of East London Mosque told me in an 
interview, “almost 90 percent of the Muslim community that lives in and around 
East London sends their kids to schools affiliated with East London Mosque.”84   
Another peculiar feature of the British Muslim community is that one 
finds people still anchored to their culture and traditions back home. It is a 
common sight to see people wearing their regional dress, especially in the case 
of females and older people. Similarly, Muslim families subscribe to those 
channels on cable/satellite TV that are in their mother tongue, and the main 
reason they give for this is that “they do not want their kids watching European 
channels because most of the programs are objectionable.”85 
Other topics that recurred frequently during my conversations with 
Muslims in the UK included forced marriages, racism, drugs and criminality, and 
unemployment.  
 
83 Interview with Mr. Umair Qureshi, resident of Bradford, January 4, 2009. 
84 Interview with Imam Abdul Qayyum, Imam of East London Mosque, London, January 6, 
2009.  
85 Interview with Mr. Samad Nevasandu, an Iraqi asylum seeker living in London, January 6, 
2009. 
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b. Reasons for Seclusion/Exclusion  
(1) Multiculturalism: There are many factors that are responsible 
for the apparent alienation of young British Muslims from mainstream influences 
in society, multiculturalism being one of them. The inability of the British 
Government to impose a single British identity and culture is the single most 
important reason “for the self imposed segregation of Muslim communities, a 
proliferation of mosques staffed by radical clerics and the establishment of 
Muslim faith schools that emphasize Koranic studies and teach South Asian 
languages.”86  
Multiculturalism has failed to facilitate cultural integration in the UK 
because it has focused too much on ethnic diversity as opposed to helping draw 
out or instill a mainstream kind of Britishness throughout the land. Consequently, 
after more than sixty years, some ethnic minorities are still ethnic minorities. The 
fact that many adhere to a different religious faith and attachment to their country 
of origin, and its culture and traditions, is deemed problematic because such 
attachments may mean a lesser propensity to identify with Britain and 
“Britishness.”87  
(2) Perception of Not Being Accepted: The urgency to enquire 
into the reasons for exclusion is partially driven by the widespread perception 
among Muslims that they are not accepted by British society, despite government 
programs to support multiculturalism. Their convictions regarding their 
experience with “Islamophobia” belie claims of tolerance.88 During my visit to the 
UK, I asked one Pakistani whether he thinks he has been accepted as  
 
86 James Wither, “A Work in Progress – The UK’s Campaign against Radicalization,” 
Occasional Paper prepared by George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, 
Germany, September 2006, 9, http://www.ProQuest.org/ (accessed December 20, 2008). 
87 M. Y. Alam, Made in Bradford (London: Route Publishers, 2006), 16. 
88 “Islamophobia” was first identified in 1997 by Runnymede Trust’s Report. The report noted 
that hostility and hatred towards British Muslims was becoming more explicit, more extreme and 
more dangerous. Ziauddin Sardar, Balti Britain: A Journey through the British Asian Experience, 
(London: Granta UK, 2008), 337.  
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British in the UK. He replied, “well, these goras tell us, you can be a British but 
not an English, who associate themselves with privileges of the House of Lords, 
foxhunting, and exclusiveness of class.”89  
According to a survey in 2002, 69 percent of Muslims felt that the 
broader society did not consider them integral to life in Britain. Since 9/11, the 
situation has grown worse. In a poll of Asian Muslims shortly after the 9/11 
attacks, 57 percent indicated that relations with non-Muslims had deteriorated. 
More than a year later, 37 percent of non-Muslims were thought be less 
sympathetic to Muslims since 9/11. This perception is not an artifact of 
community sensitivity: 84 percent of non-Muslims have indeed become more 
suspicious of Muslims since the attack.90 
(3) Clash of Values: British Muslims nowadays are undergoing 
an experience of inter-generational strain. M. Y. Alam, in his book Made in 
Bradford, attributes this tension to competition between Western secularism and 
traditional religious beliefs, leaving young Muslims in Britain caught between the 
beliefs and networks of their parents and the host-society that limits their 
acceptance on the basis of race, ethnicity, and faith.91  
The secular laws of the UK often clash with Muslim religious 
principles when it comes to issues like gambling, alcohol, investment, gender, 
adultery, homosexuality, and blasphemy. The dominant reaction to this 
predicament is a non-violent, non-political, neo-fundamentalist reinvigoration of 
faith and a return to activism that emphasizes personal action and social activism 
in search of “a new Ummah.”92 As one reporter puts it, “Reconciling these 
 
89 Interview with Mr. Rizwan Ali, a Pakistani British National who is a resident of London, 
January 5, 2009. 
90 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising – Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 89. 
91 Alam, Made in Bradford, 1.  
92 Brendan O’ Duffy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK, 
”Political Science & Politics, 2008, 38, http://www.ProQuest.org/ (accessed December 20, 2008). 
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contradictions with compromising their faith and way of life is a central challenge 
for British Muslims and the society in which they live.”93 
(4) Disenfranchisement: Today, more than ever, British Muslims 
are asked to prove themselves as not only loyal and peaceful, but also as 
integrated citizens.94 Questions revolving around loyalty and citizenship are 
regularly asked within a frame that juxtaposes Islam with Europe and, in so 
doing, frequently reasserts the emergent tensions of having a Muslim presence 
in the West.95 Social exclusion, unemployment and the lack of opportunities 
further strengthen the perception that citizenship is constructed in exclusive 
terms.96 
A report published by the Open Society Institute’s EU Monitoring 
and Advocacy Program found that Muslims in Britain (who represent 3 percent of 
the population) are the most disadvantaged faith group. They are three time 
more likely to be unemployed than Christians, have the lowest employment rate 
of any group (38 percent) and the highest level of economic inactivity (52 
percent). They tend to live in the most disadvantaged wards and their 
employment tends to be in low-paid manual and self-employed sectors. Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi Muslims in London have the highest proportion of children in 
workless households (30–40 percent).97      
 
93 Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 89. 
94 Alam, Made in Bradford, 20. 
95 Ibid., 18. 
96 Sardar, Balti Britain, 288. 
97 Duffy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” 40. 
 43
                                           
(5) Discrimination: The experience of both racial and religious 
discrimination often prompts some young Muslims to question their identity and 
how they fit into British society. Many Muslims also believe that the law treats 
them more harshly because of their religion. The Muslim community, for 
example, cites the prison sentences given to the predominantly Muslim Asian 
participants in the Bradford riots (July 2001). The average sentences for 46 
rioters were 4.5 years longer than terms handed down to rioters in Belfast.98 
Although these disparities may not be a direct result of racism, 
racial discrimination compounds the sense of exclusion and inequity. Forty 
percent of all Britons believe Britain is a racist society. Sixty percent of blacks 
and Asians say they have experienced verbal racism, 20 percent complain of 
physical racial abuse, and 33 percent of Asians feel that racial prejudice is worse 
now than it was five years ago.99  
These experiences are exacerbated by the activities of racist, right-
wing groups like the British National Party. This group is known for its public anti-
Muslim campaigns. After the worldwide row over the Danish cartoons, BNP was 
accused of deliberately ramping up racial and religious tensions by launching a 
leafletting campaign with anti-Muslim messages, including controversial cartoons 
of the Prophet Muhammad.100   
(6) What Does it Mean to be a Muslim?: Disenfranchisement 
and discrimination have led many to wonder: what does it mean to be a Muslim 
in a non-Muslim country? Here, it must be remembered that British Muslims 
enjoy only limited theological guidance about how to practice Islam in a Western 
country, dominated as it is by secular social, political, economic, and cultural 
traditions.  
 
98 Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 89. 
99 Ibid., 90. 
100 Mathew Taylor, “BNP Accused of Exploiting Cartoons Row with Muslim Leaflet,” The 
Guardian, October 5, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/oct/05/uk.advertising 
(accessed January 15, 2009). 
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This question of what it means to be Muslim in a non-Muslim 
country is complicated by the fact that Muslim minorities in Western countries are 
heterogeneous: they are frequently divided by ethnicity, language, culture, and 
religious traditions. As Olivier Roy observes, “While old minorities had time to 
build their own cultures or to share the dominant culture (Tartars, Indians, 
China’s Hui), Muslims in recently settled minorities have to reinvent what makes 
them Muslim, in the sense that the common defining factor of this population as 
Muslim is the mere reference to Islam, with no common cultural or linguistic 
heritage.”101 
c. Identity Crisis and Cognitive Opening 
Many of the young British Muslims drawn to extremism feel a sense 
of cultural alienation, disenfranchisement, and discrimination in a society that 
does not fully accept them. As a result, they appear to turn to Islam as a badge of 
collective identity to counteract their feeling of exclusion.102 Exclusion is 
constructed by outsiders, i.e., other Britons, whose discrimination reinforces 
individual Muslims’ cognitive boundaries. Consequently, despite being 
heterogeneous, Muslims recast and rationalize a collective identity expressed 
through new cultural material—names, narrative, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, 
clothing, and so on. 
Besides creating a collective identity, such alienation and 
disenfranchisement also lead to what Quintan Wiktorowicz describes as a 
cognitive opening in his article, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical 
Islam.” He claims this is a key process that enhances the likelihood that a 
potential effete will be drawn to a radical Islamist group.103 In his book Radical 
Islam Rising—Muslim Extremism in the West, Wiktorowicz further argues that 
 
101 Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 89.  
102 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 18. 
103 Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam,” 1.  
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individuals are initially inspired by a cognitive opening that shakes certitude in 
previously accepted beliefs. Once individuals are willing to expose themselves to 
new ways of thinking and worldviews, the cognitive opening helps facilitate 
possible receptivity to joining a movement and engaging in activism.104  
In many cases, individuals can address and resolve a crisis or 
psychological distress through their current belief system. But, where this seems 
inadequate, individuals may be open to other views. The specific crisis that 
prompts a cognitive opening varies across individuals. Any number of things can 
prompt a cognitive opening (e.g., experiences with discrimination, a socio-
economic crisis, political repression, etc.), which means that there is no single 
catalyst for triggering initial interest. In addition, movements can foster a 
cognitive opening through activism and outreach by raising consciousness, 
challenging and debating the status quo with/via alternative ideas, and 
persuading audiences that old ways of thinking are inadequate for addressing 
pressing economic, political, and social concerns.105 Worth noting is that when 
an individual’s identity is tied to religion or derives its meaning from religion, a 
cognitive opening may lead to “religious seeking”—a process by which an 
individual searches for some satisfactory system of religious meaning through 
which to interpret and resolve his discontent.106 
2. Effects of Environment 
a. 1980s Afghan Jihad 
Any commentary about Muslim radicalization in the UK should 
begin with the Afghan Jihad (1980–87).107  Muslims all over the world were 
 
104 Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 5.  
105 Ibid. 
106 John Lofland & Rodney Stark, “Becoming a World Server: A Theory of Conversion to 
Deviant Perspective, ”American Sociological Review,” December 1965, 868.  
107 The Iranian Revolution happened before the Afghan Jihad, but it is not considered a 
significant influence. Most of the UK Muslims are Sunnis who tend to see the Afghan Jihad as the 
first major event affecting them.   
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encouraged to be mujahids. Although there is no data available in the public 
domain that could substantiate how many British Muslims joined the jihad, it 
would be fair to say that there was a sizable involvement. Hassan Butt, a former 
jihadi, said in an interview with Bob Simon on CBS News that, “There was an 
unspoken deal between mujahideen and the UK government that as long as do 
not you do anything inside the UK it is OK with them.”108  
All-out support by family members and praise from the international 
community motivated the young Muslims to fight in the name of religion. This 
period in Britain also saw branches of jihadi organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir 
open for recruitment for the Afghanistan Jihad in  the late 1980s. In 1989, once 
the war ended and most jihadis returned home, their homecoming slowly laid the 
groundwork for major change in the thinking of British Muslims in the UK. For 
most who returned, the struggle represented an unending agenda. Afghan 
veterans became local heroes. They did not merge with society, but remained 
committed to propagating their “religious idealism”—a subterranean phenomenon 
that the British government ignored until the storm was already underway.       
b. Salman Rushdie 
The publication of Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses in 
1988 was the defining watershed for British Muslim identity and activism. 
Previously, Muslims were only seen as part of the general “Asian” community 
(despite the fact that UK Muslims are racially diverse) and their activism was 
limited to “race” issues.109 The Satanic Verses changed the matrix. 
The Muslim community called for the book’s proscription and 
“lobbied the Government by urging the PM to prosecute the author and 
publications under the Race Relations and Public Order Acts, but to their dismay, 
 
108 Hassan Butt Interview with Bob Simon on “60 Minutes,” a CBS News broadcast in March 
2007.  
109 Anthony McRoy, From Rushdie to 7/7: The Radicalization of Islam in Britain (London: 
Social Affair Unit, 2006), 10.  
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nothing happened.”110 The failure of traditional leaders to make any real impact 
opened the way for Islamists to seize the moment. On 14 January 1989, the 
Bradford Council of Mosques, with 1,000 persons present, publicly burnt the 
book, one aim being to assuage feelings of frustration in the Muslim 
community.111 This issue divided Muslims from Westerners along the fault line of 
culture, pitting the core Western value of freedom of expression—that no one 
should be killed, or face a serious threat of being killed, for what they say or 
write—against the core belief of many Muslims—that no one should be free to 
insult and malign Muslims by disparaging the honor of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Here, it is important to consider how an average Muslim regarded 
the entire episode. The greatest fear of many British Muslims was that their 
children would be contaminated by “infidel” ideas, resulting in the younger 
generation becoming morally loose, even practically apostate. Rushdie was seen 
as a paragon of this.112 As Ziauddin Sardar puts it, “Rushdie is an instantly 
recognizable historical type, the ‘brown sahib’ who is at once an insider and a 
total alien, outsider.  The brown sahib has an acute inferiority complex about his 
original identity: he hates his Indian/Muslim self. Yet, on the other hand, he 
knows he can never be accepted as a pukkah sahib.”113    
c. Kuwait (Gulf War I) 
British Muslims scarcely had time to catch their breath before 
another crisis erupted. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait captured the imagination of 
Muslims across the globe as an anti-imperialist action, reversing the artificial 
colonial borders imposed after the First World War by Britain and France.114 
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Saddam Hussein was praised for waging war because he dared to 
challenge the West directly. In contrast, the Saudis who scrambled to stop the 
war were looked at as people who had ‘betrayed’ the honor of Islam, first by their 
soft approach in the Rushdie affair and now by allowing non-Muslims to defile the 
Islamic Holy Land and attack and ‘massacre’ fellow Muslims. As with the Rushdie 
affair, during the Gulf crisis the general response among Britons was negative. 
British Muslims were denounced, insulted, threatened and physically attacked.115   
d. Bosnia   
Soon after Gulf War I, the Bosnian crisis shocked the UK Muslim 
community, in part because Bosnian Muslims held the very identity that the 
British government was understood to be suggesting for British Muslims, yet this 
did not prevent Bosnians from being slaughtered.116 Given Bosnia’s proximity to 
Britain, British Muslims expressed concern that they could be the next victims of 
Western Islamophobia.117 
The relationship of the Bosnian tragedy to the condition of British 
Muslims is crucial to understanding developments in the UK Muslim 
community.118  During the Rushdie affair, Muslims were accused of possessing 
values hostile to the cultural norms of modern Britain. During the Gulf Crisis, they 
were accused of disloyalty to the British in a wartime situation. The insinuation 
was that Muslims were not really ‘British’ and therefore not part of Western or 
European civilization. The implication of these sentiments, added to the abuse 
and occasional violence that British Muslims experienced in the streets during 
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these crises, was that Muslims were unwelcome in Britain because of their 
religion or, more specifically, because of their assertiveness about it.119   
e. 9/11 and U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan 
Some experts, including moderate Muslims leaders in the UK, also 
believe that the recent war in Afghanistan has helped radicalize still more British 
Muslims, and has strengthened terrorist recruitment efforts. The fact that it was 
the U.S. that trained these Mujahideen and used them for its own ends became 
the hot topic for discussion in the UK. For a layman, the intricacies of 
international politics were beyond understanding; here was a clear case of 
double standards. 
The British government’s support for the U.S. invasion was 
protested, and members of Islamist organizations like al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-
Tahrir openly said that they would fight and kill British troops fighting in 
Afghanistan.120 The negative effects of the Afghanistan war on the British Muslim 
community have been highlighted in various forums. British Brigadier Ed Butler’s 
comments, published in an article in The Telegraph, are particularly noteworthy. 
According to Butler, “there is a link between Kandahar and urban conurbations in 
the UK," and “the traffic between the British and Afghanistan flow in both 
directions, with some British Muslims returning from the region and posing a 
domestic security threat.”121  
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f. U.S. Invasion of Iraq 
Perhaps the gravest damage to relationships in Britain has been 
done by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. “The Iraq invasion lacked the approval of either 
the Security Council or major multilateral alliances like NATO.”122 The U.S. policy 
of going to war in Iraq stemmed from dangers posed by the potential use of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by Saddam or their transfer to terrorists. 
“After the U.S. backed coalition invaded Iraq and found no cache of WMD, the 
international community attacked the legitimacy of the war.”123 The British 
government, which provided corroborating intelligence on Iraqi WMD, also came 
under direct pressure. Britain’s status as a moral leader was damaged by the war 
in Iraq.  
The Islamists made this issue a major rallying point, and agitated 
Muslims to take to the streets in protest against the government that had Muslim 
blood on its hands. Related issues involving the treatment of detainees in Abu 
Ghraib prison and at Guantanamo Bay prison also generated a Muslim backlash 
in Britain.  
g. Social Outreach Activism   
These international events provided the radical Islamic movements 
like Hizb ut-Tahrir, Supporter of the Shariah, and al-Muhajiroun, which had bases 
or branches in the UK, with a pretext to rally Muslims to their cause. The above-
listed exogenous influences created an excellent opportunity for the Islamists to 
launch their social outreach activism. This activism affected the Muslim 
community in different ways. Many merely listened to talks and attended events 
sponsored by the various groups. Others became committed activists, willing to 
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sacrifice themselves for the cause. Such groups drew in only a small minority of 
the Muslim population in the UK as members, but an increasing number of 
Muslims seemed attracted to their message, particularly in the Midlands around 
London.124  
Why did social outreach activism by the radical groups attract so 
many Muslims from the general Muslim community in the UK? Most studies of 
the causes of Islamism offer a grievance-based explanation that blames/credits 
individual frustration and motivation for “deviant” social behavior.125 But this 
ignores the idea that Islamists perhaps fostered a cognitive opening through their 
social outreach.  
Activists made optimal use of the environment and took advantage 
of their social networks and made new acquaintances. They then germinated a 
sense of crisis among their contacts in discussions and subtle interactions. 
Islamic activists, for example, would frequently initiate innocuous discussions 
about Islam with congregants at the mosque in an effort to develop new 
relationships and instill a sense of urgency about the need to address pressing 
concerns. This includes appeals to Muslim solidarity by “educating” Muslims 
about crises in places like the Palestinian territories, Kashmir, and Bosnia.126 
Islamism offers pride in a common religious identity to relieve the 
feelings of anger, frustration, and humiliation felt by many in the Muslim world. 
These emotions are aroused by many different factors, including perceptions 
about the economic and political backwardness of much of the Middle East. The 
perception that the Western powers are the source of these Muslim ills reinforces 
a sense of grievance. Osama bin Laden, as leader of al-Qaeda, has effectively 
played on Muslim anger to gain support for his radical agenda. In a message 
after the 9/11 attacks, he claimed, “Our nation has tasted this humiliation and 
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contempt for more than eighty years. Its sons are being killed. Its blood is being 
shed, its holy places attacked and it is not being ruled according to what God has 
decreed.”127   
Another common Islamist tactic for fostering a cognitive opening 
has been the use of “moral shock.” Its main purpose is to make people receptive 
to accepting views that they otherwise would consider too radical. Moral shock is 
used to spark interest, prompt further questions, and initiate contact with potential 
joiners.128    
C.  STAGE—II: GRADUAL INDOCTRINATION  
1. Establishing a Relationship 
Activists’ first endeavor is to develop new personal ties and relationships. 
Surprisingly, their tactics are similar to those of most known religious activists. 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) recruits, for example, 
primarily through outreach efforts and the formation of new personal 
relationships.129 A similar pattern has been described for the Unification Church 
(Moonies). Members “pick up” people in public places and invite them to dinners 
and events while minimizing overt religious content. These dinners and events 
are then used to develop effective bonds to pull individuals into the network, 
where they can be encapsulated and converted into committed activists.130 
In a similar fashion, some Islamic activists, particularly jihadis, hide their 
movement identity until after a personal relationship is developed.131 Islamist 
activists identify the mosque as the typical starting point for creating new social 
ties; the relationship in the mosque is the best type of relationship because 
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people are sitting in the house of Allah, a natural religious setting where 
individuals are already predisposed to discuss issues related to religion. 
However, Islamists do not start discussing the need for jihad and radical 
transformation right away; such rash behavior will likely estrange the average 
Muslim, so activists limit their ideological discussion and hide their organizational 
affiliation. 
Although established relationships are commonly used to facilitate 
cognitive openings, activists also approach strangers and acquaintances. In 
these cases, trust has yet to be established. As a result, activists do not 
immediately leap to challenge their new friends’ beliefs. They instead begin 
slowly through casual conversation. The objective is to learn about the particular 
concerns of targeted individuals so that conversations can be shaped to address 
issues of common interest.132 In such cases, perceptions about credibility are 
essential for recruitment.133 Once seekers accept credibility and the activists’ 
right to sacred authority, the way to socialization and culturing is opened. 134 
2. Contextualizing Ideas 
Only once individuals are exposed to the movement and express initial 
interest are they persuaded and slowly indoctrinated. At this early stage, Islamist 
activists try to establish and strengthen a bond of shared values. For that, they 
employ an “educational social network as radical and moderate fundamentalists 
alike devote the bulk of their time and energies to religious learning.”135 They 
spend a great deal of time and energy discussing who they are, what they should 
become, and which people have the right to decide that.136  
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Like other “new social movements,” radical Islamic activists promote a set 
of values and identities that challenge dominant cultural codes. By doing so, they 
seek to create a common community of “true believers” tied together through a 
shared interpretation of Islam, typically characterized by high levels of tension 
with common religious understandings.137 Activists focus on teaching Muslims 
about deviance from mainstream interpretations while offering the movement’s 
own understanding as definitive.138 The resulting “network of shared meaning” is 
the basis of a common identity that frequently involves commands to risky 
activism in the name of God.139  
Activists generally tap into already formed beliefs and values to ensure 
acceptance.  Most organizations like Jamat-e-Islami, al-Muhajiroun, and Hizb ut-
Tahrir conceptualize Islam as din, an ideology or a way of life, rather then as just 
a religion because “religion” usually refers to a set of rituals or an aspect of man’s 
relationship with his Creator. Din, on the other hand, serves as a creed, upon 
which all aspects of life are built.140 By presenting Islam as a comprehensive 
system of living, activists directly challenge other dominant ideologies in a cosmic 
struggle for the soul of humanity.141 “Students are taught that following any kind 
of human-made law is apostasy because it rejects the idea of sovereignty for 
God alone.”142 This affects a wide variety of behaviors. However, this fact is 
never brought to the forefront right at the outset of indoctrination; it comes into 
play only towards the end of this stage.  
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3. Persuasion Techniques 
Mostly, the Islamist movements are voluntary in nature and do not rely on 
direct coercion to indoctrinate potential participants. People become converts 
gradually, even inadvertently, through the influence of social relationship, 
especially during times of social strain.143  
Wiktorowicz argues that conversion to Islamist includes introspection as 
well as interaction. People question, weigh, and evaluate their situation and 
options.144 The style of interaction is to take each individual on a case-by-case 
basis and identify his most relevant concerns and issues. The activists, in 
essence, try to find an issue for which Islam can be offered as a solution. 
Muhammad Omar Bakri, an Islamist militant leader who remained instrumental in 
developing Hizb ut-Tahrir and later al-Muhajiroun, provides an example that is 
worth quoting at length:145  
So what is the problem today? The way you open it is you need to 
address the person. Where do you come from? “Bangladesh.” Oh, 
Bangladesh. How is the situation there in Bangladesh? What do 
you yourself think is the problem? Why all these bombs are here 
and there? He will say, “Oh, the problem is the increasing of the 
price on rice, the rice and sugar [prices] increased.” See he makes 
his own analysis. Oh, but do you think the problem is a shortage of 
food? “I do not believe so.” What about courts? “There are cases 
that take years.” So there is a problem of management as a whole. 
So you can link it to Islam.  
All meetings, when you meet a Muslim or non-Muslim, in your mind 
are three questions: problem, solutions, action. Now you want to let 
people know the problem. They look to the symptoms. Look at the 
cause! Make him think about the cause, not the symptoms. Not the 
effect, the cause – the main problem. After that you start to inspire. 
“What should we do about that.?” Inspire him to think and give him 
some light. Interact with him, let him see. That is a solution.  
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An important thing to note here is that the activists are careful to let the 
individual come to his/her own conclusion about the issue through conversation 
and dialogue. The motive remains here to give the individual ownership over his 
or her decision to look deeper into the problem. Similarly, activists do not 
immediately jump into a discussion about enforcing Shariah or re-establishing the 
caliphate. Such a direct approach will likely turn away new contacts. Instead, the 
technique is to find issues that lead to a discussion about Islam and hopefully 
foster a cognitive opening. The movement specifically trains its activists in these 
techniques.146  
This approach is not unique to the UK. In Egypt, for example, Islamist 
pamphlets advise propagators: “Before broaching the sensitive issue at hand, the 
da’i [propagator] must cultivate a relationship with the individual in question or 
‘addressee.’ The da’i should demonstrate his empathy and concern for the 
addressee’s problem and, when possible, help resolve them. The objective is to 
first “’awaken his dormant faith’ so that ‘the addressee’s heart will become open 
to knowledge of the Day of Judgment.’ Then teach him or her about obligations 
to God.”147 Most of the Islamist groups use this approach to facilitate cognitive 
openings. 
4. “Culturing” 
To understand why some individuals eventually commit themselves to 
Islamist activism, it is important to understand “culturing,” or what activists term 
tarbiya. Islamists try to draw seekers into religious lessons, where they can be 
cultured in the movement’s ideology. The ideology emphasizes that the only way 
to achieve salvation and enter paradise on Judgment Day is to follow the 
movement’s prescribed strategy.148 Religious lessons serve as a low-risk forum 
where, over time, eventual activists are socialized into the ideological template of 
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the movement. Clearly, not every individual who is exposed to these lessons 
accepts the movement ideology as “true” Islam. But for those who become 
“intellectually affiliated” and adopt movement precepts, the Islamists offer a 
rational strategy for advancing spiritual self-interest.149  
The ideological template provided to activists during this “culturing” 
process calls for three divine duties, and the students are taught that an 
individual must fulfill all three or risk damnation. First, like the Prophet, Muslims 
must engage in tarbiya and dawa. This involves lessons and activities that teach 
people divine duties and responsibilities. The second divine duty is to promote 
virtue and prevent vice. And the third duty is the establishment of the 
Caliphate.150 The important aspect of this template is that it is believed by all 
activists to already have proved to be successful; the Prophet employed this 
method to spread Islam and for any Muslim to find fault with the system is very 
difficult.   
The cornerstone of the culturing process is the initial premise that one 
must fulfill God’s command and follow tawhid or risk individual salvation. 
Socialized to believe deeply in this premise, individuals who internalize the norms 
are likely to accept high-risk activism. Serving God is the only way to this 
salvation, and the ideology maps out how this service should be done to ensure 
paradise. Participation in the movement remains rooted in the self-interest of the 
activist who participates to protect his or her spiritual destiny.151  
D.  STAGE—III: ADOPTING A NEW ROLE  
1. Selective Incentives 
Why do individuals join a movement when they can simply “free-ride” off 
the efforts of other? This is particularly pertinent for radical Islamic groups, which 
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provide collective goods that will benefit all Muslims, such as the establishment 
of an Islamic state, the expulsion of the U.S. from Muslim lands, and divine 
justice. Given the high costs and risks associated with joining a radical 
organization, joining itself seems to defy the logic of collective action. Mancur 
Oslen and others point to the use of selective incentives that allow the group 
leaders to insure cooperation in the provision of the collective good by allowing 
access to valued group benefits that only cooperators can enjoy.152 Although 
early scholarship emphasized material incentives, later scholars have highlighted 
a number of non-material incentives that also motivate participants, including a 
sense of belonging (solidarity incentives) and purpose (purposive incentives).153 
At this stage on the path toward radicalization, individuals have been 
gradually indoctrinated and are becoming committed activists. These individuals, 
whom Wiktorowicz calls “intellectual affiliates,” exhibit a strong sense of 
belonging and find purpose in movement ideology. Religious training lies at the 
core of such activism. To ensure that they are intellectually equipped with the 
proper religious beliefs, formal members of most Islamist organizations are 
required to attend a two-hour study session held by the local halaqah every 
week; attendance is mandatory.154 The halaqah (different organizations use 
different names, e.g., Taleemi Jalsa, Majlis, Usrah, etc.) is an intensive, 
“members-only” religious lesson that revolves around the movement’s ideology, 
and students must spend time preparing for it. Given the intensity of the session, 
a lack of preparation incurs the ire of movement teachers and social pressure 
from other participants, thereby discouraging chronic indolence.155 
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Besides religious indoctrination, Islamists participate in a variety of public 
outreach events. Their participation gives them the purposive incentive that, 
unlike other Muslims, they are physically contributing to the cause. Every week, 
members host at least one public study circle, which is advertised at the local 
mosque and in the movement newsletter. The public circles are intended to 
disseminate movement ideology and draw in new recruits. Other public outreach 
programs include movement-sponsored public talks, tafsirs, and community 
events. For example, every Friday and Saturday afternoon, al-Muhajiroun 
members are required to set up a da’wa stall in their local community. Activists 
put up posters, chant slogans, shout through loudspeakers, and interact with 
observers and passing pedestrians. In effect, these are small protest rallies, 
usually attended by as many as twenty local activists.156   
2. Criticality of Social Networks for Recruitment 
Several recent studies on the spread of the religious movements have 
found that interpersonal bonds played a significant role. For instance, Heirich 
carefully assessed the relative significance of deprivation, prior socialization, and 
social influence in determining religious recruitment. While he feels that other 
factors not identified by any of these approaches may also be important, his 
detailed analysis shows that social ties had a powerful effect.157 Attitudinal 
affinity may predispose an individual to join a movement, but social ties are 
critical for transforming interest and availability into activism itself.158 For Islamic 
groups, socialization is thus critical to mobilizing support and activism in the face 
of extensive costs and risks. 
Carrie Wickham’s study of the Islamic movement in Egypt, for example, 
reveals how Islamists promoted a new ethic of civic obligation to encourage 
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participation in the public sphere, regardless of benefits and costs.159 Islamists 
propagated the new ethic of civic obligation through outreach efforts, study 
circles, religious lessons, tafsirs, person-to-person conversation, and 
discussions. Likewise, in a study of pacifist movements, James Downton and 
Paul Wehr also cite socialization as one of the most critical variables for ensuring 
continued commitment. Both are of the opinion that, during recruitment for 
collective action, various socialization influences effect the formation of beliefs, 
which make people more attitudinally available for activism. 160  
The typical pattern, then, is not one of an isolated individual independently 
searching for religious answers. Heirich believes that impact of social networks is 
striking indeed—for those already oriented towards religious quest.161 Whether 
prompted by an independent cognitive opening or attracted through movement 
outreach, seekers do not typically seek religious meaning in a vacuum. They turn 
to friends and family for direction and as possible sources of religious learning. 
When their social contacts bring them into contact with a movement, seekers are 
likely to be drawn to the movement’s activities since social ties are trusted 
pathways of information.162  
In the case of Islamic movements, seekers frequently “seek” with friends 
who are also interested in religious learning. This increases the social 
dimensions of the activism and the prospects for solidarity.163 Activists 
themselves usually begin by targeting people they know, thus increasing the 
importance of social pathways in both directions: seekers reach out to activists’ 
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friends, and activists’ friends reach out to seekers.164 Activists can use these 
relationships to foster “guided religious seeking” and lead seekers to movement 
events, especially when the cognitive opening is prompted by movement 
outreach. 
3. Constructing Interpretive Schemata 
The last of the three factors that facilitate participation relates to “framing,” 
a domain where the role of ideas, culture, and cognition come into play. Frames 
represent “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label” occurrences within activists’ life space and the world around. 
Besides that, such frames are not limited to guiding individual actions but are 
also highly effective for collective actions.165 They offer a language and cognitive 
tools for making sense of events and experiences by interpreting causation, 
evaluating situations, and offering proscriptive remedies. 
David Snow and Robert Benford argue that “by rendering events or 
occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide 
action, whether by individuals or the collective.”166 However, only when there is 
“frame alignment” between an individual and a movement are recruitment and 
mobilization possible. The movement’s schemata must resonate with an 
individual’s own interpretive framework to facilitate participation. This alignment is 
contingent on fidelity with familiar cultural narratives, symbols, and identities. 
Hence, to achieve optimum “frame alignment,” Islamist activists are expected to 
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operate.167 This is considered necessary to facilitate public outreach, 
communication, and recruitment. For instance, the requirements for every 
member of al-Muhajiroun are: 
1. To take care of the affairs of the people in society.  
2. To have a deep understanding of the society: patterns of thought, 
concepts, emotions, culture, customs and public opinions.  
3. To be well equipped with al-Muhajiroun’s objectives, methods, 
concepts, thoughts, culture, work and administration.  
4. To have a deep understanding of the groups and the parties in the 
society, and the different types of thought and disagreements among 
the members of a group and among groups.168   
Thus, there is a requirement for all activists to intensively study and 
master not only the movement’s ideology, but also social and political issues. 
Consequently, members demonstrate a voracious appetite for current events, 
particularly concerning Muslims, such as the war on terrorism, the situation in 
Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An urge to stay up-to-date on 
contemporary news, however, does not necessarily translate into an accurate 
understanding of global issues.169  
Another factor critical to “frame alignment” is the reputation of the frame 
articulator. The reputation of the frame articulator affects the credibility and the 
salience with which the frame is viewed.170 To persuade Muslims to accept a 
radical religious interpretation and thus spread radical networks of shared 
meaning, groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun try to convince audiences 
that they have the authority to issue and promote interpretations in the first 
place.171 
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Once an individual is accepted as a formal member of the movement, the 
culturing process becomes deeper and more complex. As already described for 
al-Muhajiroun, members participate in “members-only” lessons that deal with 
more specific technical elements of the ideology. These lessons are run by local 
branch leaders, who are responsible for leading and managing the lessons.172  
E.  STAGE—IV: RADICALIZATION  
1. Low Risk Activism 
Radicalization represents the end-state of an Islamist’s activism in most 
cases. Here, I will explain how individuals are convinced to engage in high-risk, 
high-cost activism through the process of radicalization. I have already covered 
how religious education exposes individuals to deliberate “culturing” with the 
intent of inculcating the movement’s ideology. “Through lessons and other 
activities, the movement tries to shift individual understandings of self interest in 
a manner that facilitates progression to risky activism.”173 
McAdam, for example, argues that socialization through low-risk activism 
can help “pave the way” for riskier forms of contention: “These ‘safe’ forays into 
activism may have longer-range consequences…for they place the new recruit 
‘at risk’ of being drawn into more costly forms of participation with the cyclical 
process of integration and resocialization.174 
Those who join because they are religious seekers do so, in part, because 
they find mainstream religious institutions and figures wanting. For these 
individuals, local imams and mosques have failed to provide guidance for the 
specific concerns of British Muslims. As a result, such individuals are more 
amenable to experimentation outside the mainstream. However, not everyone 
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who experiences a cognitive opening is drawn to a radical organization; in fact, 
most never experiment with radical Islam. 
What is so notable about most activists who engage in low risk activism is 
that they are young. Being idealistic, every generation of youth believes it has the 
power to change the world. It is this normal stage in young men’s intellectual and 
psychological development that radicals seize and manipulate so effectively.175  
Earlier in this chapter, I described how the culturing process reframes the 
initial premise that one must fulfill God’s command and follow tawhid, and 
emphasizes instead that failure to do so will risk individual salvation. Frame 
articulators gradually disclose that God’s commands include risky activism. 
Participation in the movement gets narrowed down to the self-interest of the 
activist who participates to protect his or her spiritual destiny. In fact, for 
individuals who become “intellectually affiliated,” deviation from the ideological 
template will jeopardize prospects of individual, never mind collective, 
salvation.176  
2. High Risk Activism  
Some scholars now argue that even suicide bombings, once seen as the 
ultimate acts of irrationality, are part of a rational tactic capable of prompting 
concessions in asymmetrical warfare.177 Tactics and activism are usually viewed 
as rational in the sense that they are means designed to achieve a group’s goals. 
A small handful of studies argue that individual suicide bombers can be 
understood as acting rationally if one emphasizes such things as the importance 
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of solidarity and contract enforcement between the organization and individual 
bombers called “art of martyrdom,” which makes it difficult to detect.178 
High risk activism is similar to what the NYPD in its report, “Radicalization 
in the West: The Home-grown Threat,” calls Jihadization—the phase in which 
members of a cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-
designate as mujhadeen.179 The report suggests that activities during this stage 
are in fact “acts in furtherance,” involving planning, preparation, and execution. It 
correctly points out that unlike other phases in the radicalization process, which 
may take place gradually, the shift towards high risk activism can be a rapid 
process. Elaborating on this transition from low risk activism to high risk activism, 
the Report notes that individuals generally appear to begin the radicalization 
process on their own. Invariably, as they progress through the stages of 
radicalization, they seek like-minded individuals. This leads to the creation of 
groups or clusters. These clusters appear crucial to progressing to high risk 
activism—the critical stage that ends up with some engagement in terrorist 
activity.180 Terrorism is the extreme consequence of radicalization, the early 
signs of which are likely to be involvement in a variety of support activities, 
including criminality.181   
Once an individual joins a cluster he moves into a totally different sphere. 
His entire life then revolves around that small network. “Group think” is one of the 
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Group think acts as a force-multiplier for radical thought, while creating a 
competitive environment among the group members for who is the most 
radical.182 
Once action becomes a group objective, each member of the cluster is 
challenged to accept jihad as an individual obligation—and they anoint 
themselves as holy warriors. This act of accepting a personal duty to participate 
in jihad is, by its very nature, an internal decision and one with very a subtle, if 
not visible, signature. In fact, the only way to know if someone has passed this 
marker is by observing his subsequent actions or by gaining a window into his 
personal feelings.183 
F.  CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the generalized pathways to radicalization have been 
validated with the help of available information on the subject. I have modeled 
the path that Muslims take towards radicalization in four distinct stages: crisis, 
indoctrination, adopting a new role, and radicalization. It should be possible to 
see how Ed Husain’s journey fits this trajectory.   
What is important is that there be a pervasive environment that helps 
Islamists gradually indoctrinate vulnerable people. The role of social and 
personal contacts is of special importance in the recruitment process. I have tried 
to bring to the forefront the extent to which religious organizations and social 
networks help activists mobilize resources, and engage in culturing and 
persuasion techniques. Equally important to appreciate is how low risk activism 
paves the way for high risk activities. Notably, there are no clear boundaries 
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My intent has been to explain how the contagion of radicalization spreads. 
I want to now draw attention to how a small number of Islamists, with smartly 
contextualized ideas, given a receptive environment can spread their influence at 
a god’s speed.   
 68
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IV. PROLIFERATION OF RADICALISTS’ IDEAS IN THE UK 
A. INTRODUCTION    
In the last chapter, I highlighted a few peculiarities of Muslim societies in 
the UK: Muslims have dwelled in certain areas; within the context of larger British 
society, Muslims communities are closed and conservative; and Muslims have 
their own food shops, mosques, schools, and recreational spots. Mostly, the 
Muslims see this distinctiveness as a defense mechanism against racial and 
religious discrimination. This pervasive environment in turn facilitates the process 
of religious indoctrination that Islamists initiate through social outreach 
activism.184  
Activists employ existing social networks to germinate a sense of crisis 
among contacts in discussions and subtle interactions. During this entire process 
mostly personal relationships are exploited, and peer group friendships and 
kinship connections prove especially useful.185 Special attention is paid towards 
framing ideas so as to make them stickier. Word-of-mouth is the main medium of 
communication and persuasion. Islamists select places like mosques, 
universities, and Muslims’ recreation spots where they recruit people by 
engaging them in discussion. Their method of engagement includes all the 
techniques of modern canvassing. 
When we dig deeper, what we find are three mechanisms worth further 
investigation. First is the presence of “influentials,” a minority of individuals in the 
shape of Islamists who influence an exceptional number of their peers. Second is 
the idea of stickiness engineering, involving deliberate efforts to package 
information that resonates with the public’s lived experience. Third involves the 
environment or context and focuses on the readiness of the audience to receive 
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the message. All three of these come close to the mechanism Malcolm Gladwell 
describes in his book The Tipping Point: the Law of the Few, the Stickiness 
Factor, and the Law of Context. 
In this Chapter, I will attempt to employ Gladwell’s theoretical notions of 
spreading new ideas to illustrate how radicalists’ ideas proliferated in the UK like 
a social epidemic. 
B. THE LAW OF THE FEW 
The Muslim Community in the UK, comprising migrants from different 
countries, resembles a society that is fragmented into clusters of individuals 
having similar characteristics. “The Muslims who migrated in the UK prefer to 
develop social associations with their own countrymen—friendships and 
marriages are done within the same community.”186 Interestingly, the observed 
mechanism of preferential attachment tends to be linear. In his book, The 
Islamist, Ed Husain writes that his friendship with Falik allowed him to connect to 
more people, and new social clusters like the YMO.187 Throughout his journey 
inside different radical networks, Ed Husain was always influenced by a few 
people. We find ample evidence in The Islamist that the proliferation of radicalism 
has been governed by Milgram’s “Six Degrees of Separation”—a very small 
number of people are linked to everyone else in a few steps. Although the 
Islamists Husain describes operate in different distinct hubs, like YMO, Hizb ut-
Tahrir, or al-Muhajiroun, their frequent interaction with each other enables them 
to recruit new people from the vast pool of society.188  
Another factor is the role of word-of-mouth with respect to social ties and 
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propagation has mostly remained word-of-mouth. Gladwell likewise highlights 
interpersonal connection through word-of-mouth and notes that some people are 
more influential than others.  
1. Interpersonal Connections Through Word-of-Mouth 
One of the most widely accepted notions related to behavior in networked 
societies is that word-of-mouth communication plays an important role in shaping 
people’s attitudes and behaviors.189 For example, “word-of-mouth is the most 
important source of influence in the purchase of household goods and food 
products. It was seven times as effective as newspapers and magazines, four 
times as effective as personal selling, and twice as effective as radio advertising 
in influencing consumers to switch brands.”190  
People pass on all kinds of information to each other all the time through 
word-of-mouth. “But it’s only in a rare instance that such exchanges ignite the 
word-of-mouth epidemic.”191 While highlighting this anomaly, Gladwell attributes 
the start of a word-of-mouth epidemic to “involvement of people with a particular 
rare set of social gifts.”192  
One finds illustrations of this in Ed Husain’s book. Ed Husain was mostly 
influenced by messages that came to him through word-of-mouth. Dawa and 
Islamists’ activism heavily relied upon word-of-mouth communication. Though 
Husain and other activists started their canvassing among those with whom they 
had “stronger ties,” we find them quickly approaching almost anyone and 
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within a closed, networked environment indoctrinated specific ideas through 
word-of-mouth.193 Due to their interactive nature, these sessions had a huge 
influence. 
From the standpoint of word-of-mouth communications, the above 
discussion confirms Mark Granovetter’s theory that “the strength of weak ties 
provides a promising explanation of the process by which word-of-mouth 
behavior at a micro level is linked to macro level phenomena.”194 “Stronger ties” 
exist among people who have close relations, like family members and close 
friends, whereas “weaker ties” describes relations with general people through 
referral connections, like persons in the neighborhood. Between the weaker and 
stronger ties, Islamists pay more attention to the “weaker ties.” For them, the 
significance of “weaker ties” arises due to their important bridging function that 
allows information to travel from one densely knit clump of already connected 
people to other segments of society. 
2. Societal Links—Some People are More Influential  
In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment to answer what is 
known as the Small World problem: how are humans connected? This led to his 
famous concept of “Six Degrees of Separation.”195 Explaining Milgram’s 
Concept, Gladwell writes that “Six Degrees of Separation” does not mean that 
everyone is linked to everyone else in just six steps. Instead, it means that a very 
small number of people are linked to everyone else in a few steps, and the rest of 
us are linked to the world through those special few.196 Gladwell further writes 
that these people on whom we rely more heavily than we realize act as crucial  
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societal links; they are people with a special gift for bringing the world 
together.197 Gladwell characterizes these individuals as connectors, mavens, 
and salesmen.  
a. Connectors  
What makes someone a connector? The first and most obvious 
criterion is that Connectors know lots of people. Sprinkled among every walk of 
life, in other words, are a handful of people with a truly extraordinary knack of 
making friends and acquaintances.198 They master what sociologists call the 
“weak tie,” a friendly yet casual social connection. Connectors are important for 
more than simply the number of people they know. Their importance is also a 
function of the kinds of people they know.199 Connectors are people whom all of 
us can reach in only a few steps because, for one reason or another, they 
manage to occupy many different worlds, subcultures, and niches, which is a 
function of something intrinsic to their personality, some combination of curiosity, 
self-confidence, sociability, and energy.200 Ed Husain, Majid Nawaz (Ed Husain’s 
“musharif” in Newham), Amir Nawaz, and Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) activist 
Zahid Amin are some examples of Connectors. Each one exhibits another 
characteristic of being a Connector; he has the “uncanny genius of being at the 
centre of events” and has a foot in many different worlds. 201    
Gladwell’s Connectors establish both stronger and weaker ties, but 
a critical review of Islamists’ network topology suggests that weaker ties are 
again more important since these serve as bridges, linking closely knit network 
segments. It is through these weaker ties that the word-of-mouth epidemic 
proliferates. 
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It would be a mistake, however, to think that Connectors are the 
only people who matter in spreading radicalism. After all, who taught Connectors 
their Islamist ideology? In examining this social epidemic, it becomes clear that 
just as there are people who connect people via an Islamist ideology, there are 
also people who could be termed religious information specialists—the Mavens.  
b. Mavens 
Mavens are the second category of people who contribute to word-
of-mouth epidemics. A Maven is someone who accumulates knowledge. Mavens 
know what is happening around them.202 What is critical about Mavens is that 
they are not passive collectors of information but are individuals who, after 
acquiring particular knowledge, want to tell everyone about it too.203 
In The Islamist, Mavens are Ed Husain’s religious “mentors” and 
Ulema (Ulema are those who have knowledge). Siraj of East London Mosque, 
Omar Bakri and Mohammad al-Masri of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Hamza Yousuf 
Hanson of ISB were the prominent clerics who could be termed Mavens. They 
had the knowledge and the social skills to start a word-of-mouth epidemic, 
though what really sat them apart was not so much what they knew, but their 
desire to help others, which turned out to be a very effective way to gain others’ 
attention. A “Maven is someone who solves his own problems—his own 
emotional needs—by solving other people’s problems.”204 This trait was quite 
explicit in all the above-mentioned individuals and made them appear selfless—
an essential attribute of “influentials.” 
Mavens are more influential than Connectors, due to their ability to 
make a particular case so emphatically that listeners take their advice. “A Maven 
is not the kind of person who wants to twist your arm. To be a Maven is to be a 
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teacher.”205 Mavens and Connectors have different personalities and act for 
different reasons. But, they both have the power to spark a word-of-mouth 
epidemic.206 Mavens are data banks; they provide the message. Connectors are 
the social glue; they spread it. 
c. Salesmen 
The one thing that a Maven is not is a persuader.207 For that, there 
is another group of people—Salesmen—with skills to persuade us when we are 
otherwise unconvinced about what we are hearing.208 Salesmen are as critical to 
the “tipping” of word-of-mouth epidemics as Connectors and Mavens. The 
attributes that facilitate the Salesmen’s ability to persuade others is their capacity 
to build trust and rapport in five to ten minutes, when this would take most people 
half an hour. They engage in what is called motor mimicry to emotionally effect 
others.209 Gladwell argues that emotion works outside-in, making it possible for 
some people to exert an enormous amount of influence over others.210  
Salesmen are emotionally contagious, which makes them excellent 
persuaders. In UK Muslim communities, we do not find this category of people as 
a separate entity. Rather, some of the individuals from the other two groups 
(Connectors and Mavens) undertake Salesman tasks. Once recruits are 
indoctrinated, and as they adopt their new role as Islamists, they start canvassing 
as Salesmen. The radical organization they join trains them in persuasion 
techniques. People are selected for these tasks during Tarbiyat. Those who do 
this job efficiently later become Connectors, and some of these end up as 
Mavens as well.  
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C.  STICKINESS FACTOR 
According to Gladwell’s Law of the Few, there are exceptional people out 
there who are capable of starting word-of-mouth epidemics. All you have to do is 
to find them. The lesson of stickiness is similar. There is a simple way to package 
information that, under the right circumstances, can make it irresistible. All you 
have to do is find it. By carefully structuring and formatting material to enhance 
its attractiveness, people engage in stickiness engineering.  
Chip and Dan Heath in their book, Made to Stick, identify six different tools 
to make a message stickier. I will use these to elaborate how Islamists achieved 
stickiness in their message.   
1. Simplicity  
A compact message carrying the “core” can be defined as simple. Finding 
the “core” requires stripping an idea down to its most critical essence. To get to 
the core, we have to weed out superfluous and tangential elements.211 Phrases 
like, “Islam is the solution,”212 “Allah’s Law in Allah’s Land,”213 “God created 
Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve,”214 are some examples of messages that 
are short like sound bites, yet carry proverbial meanings.  
Many of the Islamists’ sticky ideas are actually “generative” metaphors in 
disguise. Generative metaphors, like proverbs, derive their power from a clever 
substitution: they substitute something easy to think about for something more 
difficult.215 For example, “Islam is the Solution” and “Allah’s Law in Allah’s Land” 
offer the listener tangible, easily processed statements that can be used for 
guidance in complex, emotionally fraught situations. Such simple ideas are 
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especially helpful in guiding individual decisions in an environment where people 
share common beliefs, offering rules of thumb for expected behavior.  
2. Unexpectedness  
How do we get our audience to pay attention to our ideas, and how do we 
maintain their interest when it takes time to get the ideas across? According to 
the Heath brothers, the most basic way to grab someone’s attention is to break a 
pattern. Our brain is designed to be keenly aware of changes. The Heaths say 
that smart designers are well aware of this tendency and make sure that, when 
products require users to pay attention, something changes.216  
It is possible to use surprise—an emotion whose function is to increase 
alertness and cause focus—to grab people’s attention. But, surprise does not 
last. In order to ensure their idea would endure, the Islamists instead generated 
interest and curiosity by employing the Gap Theory and arousing curiosity. 
According to the Gap Theory, we need to open gaps in people’s knowledge 
before we close them. The Islamists believed it was a mistake to give the people 
the facts right away. First, they made people realize they lacked facts by posing a 
question or puzzle that would confront the listener with a gap in his 
knowledge.217 In 1994, the Hizb in the UK drew people’s attention by suggesting 
that something momentous was about to happen in the Middle East. They 
propagated the notion that the Khilafat would soon be announced in some Arab 
country. For publicity purposes, they put stickers everywhere stating: Khilafat—
Coming Soon to a Country Near You? The message attracted a lot of attention 
and many people who otherwise would not have taken an interest asked what 
this was all about.  
Run of the mill ideas are the enemy of sticky messages. As the Heaths 
write, “When messages sound like common sense, they float gently in one ear 
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and out the other. Because they intuitively know what you want to tell them.”218 
Islamists always tried to come up with innovative ways to convey messages. 
When they could not tamper with the message itself, they devised new 
propagation techniques.  
3. Concreteness  
What makes a message “concrete”? If speaking concretely is the only way 
to ensure that our ideas will mean the same thing to everyone in our audience, 
how can we convey our ideas in concrete language? 
Abstraction is the luxury of the expert. Concrete language helps people, 
especially novices, understand new concepts. According to the Heaths, if you 
have to teach an idea to a room full of people, and you are not certain what they 
know, concreteness is the only safe language to use as it is something that helps 
you construct building blocks on people’s existing knowledge and perceptions.  
Islamists always build their argument around some religious perception or 
set of fundamental Muslims beliefs. For example:  
Allah is our Lord 
Mohammad is our Leader 
The Quran is our Constitution 
Jihad is our way 
Martyrdom is our Desire 219 
If we analyze this message, we will appreciate that most Muslims cannot 
object to anything said in it. It covers the entire spectrum of the Muslim’s life. It is 
easy to remember, being short, yet so meaningful that you can spend hours 
discussing each line.    
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What is it about concreteness that makes ideas stick? The answer lies in 
the nature of our memories. Many of us have a sense that remembering 
something is a bit like putting it in storage. There are some terms that get saved 
in our minds and any reference to these by others adds strength to their 
arguments. For instance, the words jahilia, Kuffar, Mushriqeen, and Khilafat 
resonate deeply for most Muslims. Concreteness through such references 
creates a shared “foundation” on which people can come together and 
collaborate. “Everybody feels comfortable that they are tackling the same 
challenge.”220 
4. Credibility  
How do we make people believe our ideas?  
If we are trying to persuade a skeptical audience to “buy” a new message 
we are usually fighting an uphill battle against a lifetime of other people’s 
personal experience and biases. In such situations, we seldom have an external 
authority who can vouch for our message; most of the time our message has to 
vouch for itself. It must have “internal credibility.”221 What is unusual about the 
Islamist case in the UK is that Islamists simply manipulated their message and 
packaged it in a wider belief system that people already know. Their message 
had the desired credibility due to its link to the audience’s beliefs.  
Another factor that made the Islamists’ message credible was the stature 
of the messenger. Connectors, Mavens and Salesmen were people already 
trusted for their knowledge. Islamists employed their networking ability to effect. 
Also, the people who preached and invited others to engage in jihad were mostly 
those who themselves had experienced jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Iraq.  
 
220 Heaths, Made to Stick, 123.  
221 Ibid., 137.  
 80
                                           
5.  Emotions 
How do we get people to care about our ideas?  
The Heaths write that sometimes the hardest part is to find the right 
emotion to harness. They theorize that thinking about statistics, for instance, 
shifts people into a more analytical frame of mind. When people think analytically 
they are less likely to think emotionally.222 Hence, to influence people, we need 
to demonstrate how our ideas are associated with things that people already care 
about. “We appeal to their self-interest, but we also appeal to their identities—not 
only the people they are right now but to the people they would like to be.”223 
The Islamists did all this. Their messages were emotionally charged, were 
intensely associated with things people already cared about, and always carried 
an appeal to their identity. For example, one of the leaflets being distributed by 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in January 2009 carried the following message: “Mobilising the 
troops for battle in response to Gaza slaughter, is Mandatory on the rulers, else it 
amounts to treason with Allah, His Prophet, and the Believers!”224  
6. Stories 
How do we get people to act on our ideas?   
The oldest tool of influence in human history is to tell stories.225 An 
emotional idea makes people care and the right story makes people act.226 
People do not want more information. To borrow from Gladwell, people want 
faith—faith in you, your goals, your success, in the story you tell. Facts do not  
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give birth to faith. Faith needs a story to sustain it—a meaningful story that 
inspires people to believe in you and renews hope that your ideas indeed offer 
what you promise.227 
When you want to influence someone, trust becomes the connection that 
serves as a conduit for your message. Other methods of influence—persuasion, 
bribery, or charismatic appeals—are push strategies. Telling a story is a pull 
strategy.228 If your story is good enough, people of their own free will come to the 
conclusion they can trust you and the message you bring.229  
D. THE POWER OF CONTEXT 
Epidemics are sensitive to the conditions, meaning the circumstances of 
the times and places in which they occur. Context—which can be defined as the 
whole background to a particular situation, issue, or problem—has a strong 
influence on participants. In his book, Medium is the Message, Marshall 
McLuhan writes: “Our environment compels commitment and participation. We 
have become irrevocably involved with, and responsible for, each other.”230 
Pushing his argument further, McLuhan says “the environment that man creates 
becomes his medium for defining his role in it.”231 
1. Radicalism as an Epidemic  
This idea of radicalization as an epidemic may seem a little strange. We 
can say that Islamists’ radicalism proliferated like a contagion, but it is not clear 
that radicalization follows the same rules that fashions or fads do. Fashion trends 
involve relatively straightforward and simple things—a product and a message.  
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Islamists’ radicalism, on the other hand, is not a single discrete thing, but a 
phenomenon used to describe an almost impossibly varied and complicated set 
of behaviors.  
Radical activists can face serious consequences for their actions. What 
activists do often puts them at great personal peril. As with crime, it does not 
seem that the psychological predisposition to break the law would be transmitted 
casually, from one person to another. Yet, somehow in the UK, this is exactly 
what has occurred. Between the beginning and the middle of the 1990s, the UK 
saw the spread of radicalism that tipped off during the end of the 1990s and 
continued into the early 2000s. There were just as many religiously inclined 
people living in the UK at the peak of this radicalism as before, but for some 
reason a small number of these individuals suddenly dominated the environment.  
The incidents that took place during this period had a huge impact on 
Muslim society, and in a big way helped Islamists to propagate radicalism. The 
bits that formulated the environmental mosaic for the British Muslim community 
at the time included: hostility toward the Saudis for allowing the U.S. and other 
“non-Muslim” forces to be stationed in the Kingdom—an act many considered a 
betrayal of Islam; hostility  to the politics of western governments and specifically 
the British Government in the domestic sphere; and antagonism toward the 
British Government for its refusal to ban Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic 
Verses. Also, there was Britain’s involvement in the first Gulf War, its rejection of 
military action to aid Bosnian Muslims, and its commitment to the U.S. GWOT.  
2. Broken Window Theory 
According to James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, if a window is broken 
and left unrepaired, people walking by will conclude that no one cares and no 
one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken, and the sense of anarchy 
will spread from the building to the street, sending a signal that anything goes.232 
 
232 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 141.  
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The Broken Widow Theory can help us understand the UK Muslim 
community’s radicalization. When people started displaying an unusual religious 
inclination in the 1990s by setting up exclusive foundations in mosques, 
canvassing on behalf of extremist thoughts, and openly espousing radicalism, the 
UK Government did not do anything. As Ed Husain writes, “Britain offered the 
Hizb the freedom to express its ideas freely and recruit uninhibitedly. The Hizb 
was legal in Britain, but illegal in the Arab World.”233 As a result, people in 
particular Muslim communities thought their activism was the right way to publicly 
express themselves. When this public expression spread from the close quarters 
of mosques to the streets without eliciting a response from the authorities, it sent 
the signal that “anything goes.” In turn, that rendered radicalism as contagious as 
crime, which can start with a broken window and spread through an entire 
community.  
3. Broken Window Theory & the Power of Context    
In essence, Malcolm Gladwell applies the Broken Window theory to the 
Power of Context. Both are based on the premise that “an epidemic can be 
tipped, by tinkering with the smallest details of the immediate environment.” 234  
In order to understand the relationship it is important to figure out what the 
Broken Window and Power of Context suggest in the framework of radicalization. 
Both suggest that a radical activist is someone acutely sensitive to his 
environment, who is alert to all kinds of cues, and who is prompted to commit to 
Islamist theory based on his perception of the world around him. For example, Ed 
Husain’s bias toward religion was grounded in his early home life. He moved 
along the path of radicalization slowly. Small incidents against Muslims kept 
reinforcing his belief that the West in fact was at war with Muslims. 
Consequently, Husain and many like him started idealizing those who had fought 
the Afghan Jihad. The UK Government’s silence about Jihadis from Britain 
 
233 Husain, The Islamist, 87. 
234 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 146.  
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encouraged the younger generation to follow their example. No one figured out in 
the mid-and late 90s that these trends one day would lead to violent radicalism.   
The Power of Context is an environmental argument. It says that behavior 
is a function of social context. It also says that what really matters is little 
things.235 Duncan Watts explains this relationship more succinctly. He poses a 
question: Why could we not kick-start a particular trend every time?236 His 
answer: “trends’ success not always depends on the person who starts it, but on 
how susceptible the environment is overall to the trend…if the environment is 
ready to embrace a trend, almost anyone can start one and if it isn’t, then almost 
no one can.”237   
4. Context of Narrative 
While constructing a plot, the narrator establishes the context for his/her 
story but the words that the storyteller uses in the story certainly go a long way 
towards establishing context as well. Nevertheless, it is the relationship with the 
audience that the teller establishes early on that sets the narrative context. “This 
relationship is highly dependant on attributes of the situation—how relevant is the 
environment to the narrative.”238 Political science research has found that people 
are far more critical of data that opposes their accepted beliefs and much more 
accepting of confirming data, even when weak or suspect. When the audience 
knows the context of a story, it essentially adopts and accepts the point-of-view 
of the narrator. From this point on, the storyteller assumes both power and 
responsibility, to either give them what it expects or what it does not expect.239   
 
235 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 151.  
236 Duncan J. Watts, “Challenging the Influentials Hypothesis,” WOMMA Measuring Word of 
Mouth, Volume 3, 207, http://www.ProQuest.org/ (accessed February 19, 2009). 
237 Clive Thompson, “Is Tipping Point Toast?” 5, http://www.fastcompany.com/ 
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239 Kevin Brooks, “The Context Quintet: Narrative Elements Applied to Context Awareness,” 
2, http://www.Jstore.org/ (accessed February 15, 2009).  
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When we are trying to make an idea, attitude, or product tip, we are trying 
to change our audience in some small yet critical respect: we are trying to infect 
them, sweep them up in our epidemic, convert them from hostility to acceptance. 
That can be done through the influence of special kinds of people, people with 
extraordinary personal connections—this is the Law of the Few. It can also be 
done by changing the content of communications, by making a message so 
memorable that it sticks in people’s mind and compels them to action—this is the 
Stickiness Factor. Both of these laws make intuitive sense.  
But we also need to remember that small changes in context can be just 
as important in tipping epidemics. This brings us back to context. Once you 
understand that the context matters and that relatively smaller elements in the 
environment can serve as Tipping Points, then outcomes can be altered. 
Environmental Tipping Points are things that we can change.240 We, for 
instance, can fix Islamists’ organizations and overshadow their message with our 
own message by planning small changes in their messages and their activism, 
as the next chapter will prop
E.  CONCLUSION   
Gladwell’s The Tipping Point, is about social epidemics. The laws he 
describes—the Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor, and the Law of Context—
are not scientifically proven laws of human nature. He himself relies on rhetoric 
and examples that we normally come across in our daily life to make his own 
“theory” stick. In fact, what he presents is largely common sense: if you want to 
spread a message, the audience has to be ready for the message (the context); 
the message has to resonate with people (stickiness); and the message must be 
spread through the right people (the few).  
These factors, if skillfully manipulated, can help spread information at an 
accelerated rate. Gladwell’s theory, though substantiated through anecdotal 
 
240 Brooks, “The Context Quintet: Narrative Elements Applied to Context Awareness,” 167.  
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evidence, provides a workable framework for understanding how the proliferation 
of radicalism has taken place among UK Muslim communities. This chapter has 
detailed how effectively Gladwell’s theory explains the start of radicalism among 
Muslims in the UK. By following the simple rules of marketing a small number of 
Islamists made their message credible, persuasive, and stickier. Word-of-mouth 
and interpersonal connections were critical, as was context and the environment.     
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V. DE-RADICALIZATION AND SPREADING MODERATE IDEAS 
A. INTRODUCTION   
Can we reverse the tide of Islamist radicalization in the UK? What would 
be the basic contours of our proposed de-radicalization campaign? How would 
we construct the most suitable narrative? Finally, can we proliferate our ideas to 
support our narrative based upon Gladwell’s notion of a tipping point? These are 
some of the questions that I intend to address in this chapter.  
Thus far, I have tried to describe a general pattern of radicalization found 
among UK Muslims. Detailed analysis of Ed Husain’s book, The Islamist, and 
subsequent validation of its findings point to a distinct path for Muslim 
radicalization. In Chapter IV, I described the techniques Islamists employ to 
spread their extremist ideology during this process of radicalization. In the current 
chapter it is time to grapple with how we can reverse the process of radicalization 
and spread ideas of moderation within the British Muslim community. 
There are indications that the majority of Muslims in the UK are growing 
frustrated with the radicals among them. If we accept this argument, it means 
there is a cognitive opening for diffusion of a counter-idea. This counter-idea 
should not necessarily be the exact opposite of Islamism. Indeed, if it is couched 
in purely theological terms it would run a high chance of being knocked down by 
radicals on theological grounds. Ideally, it should instead be an idea that 
counters radicalization, yet avoids the possibility of a direct theological 
confrontation. At the same time, such an idea should address real grievances 
and help Muslims rescue their younger generation from championing extremist 




                                           
This chapter recommends strengthening “family” as one such potential 
counter-radicalization tool or idea. In doing so, I explain why pursuing the 
strengthening of family values should take the sting out of Islamists’ activism and 
thwart the process of radicalization.    
B. REVERSING THE TIDE OF RADICALISM  
Chapter III highlighted the Muslims’ trauma of victimization in different 
parts of the world, and describes how this resonated with Muslims’ personal 
feelings of exclusion from broader British society, leading to collective 
dissonance and a cognitive opening. These experiences enabled Islamists to 
exploit this cognitive opening and push fellow Muslims toward radicalism. In that 
sense, radicalism itself acts much like an innovation. According to Everett Rogers 
in Diffusion of Innovations, an innovation does not encompass any new 
knowledge. It is instead based upon knowledge that most may have known for 
some time, but have yet to actually embrace or reject.  
It takes persuasion to get people to adopt an innovation, whose “newness” 
often amounts to simply seeing the same world (or set of problems) from a new 
perspective. Rogers calls this adaptive phenomenon “reinvention,” and asserts 
that an innovation diffuses more rapidly when it can be reinvented. An innovation 
will also diffuse more rapidly when its adoption is more likely to be sustained. 
Indeed, this exactly describes what we have seen with Islamism in the UK—
thanks to Mavens, Connectors, and Salesman, the stickiness factor, and a 
conducive environment.241  
For almost a decade, a small percentage of Muslims have been following 
the radicalists’ path. Today, the Islamists’ innovation of the 1990s has come full 
circle to reach a point where its adopters have started to become isolated from 
mainstream society. The violent ends of this innovation have created a distaste 
for it. This can be confirmed and substantiated through the findings of a survey of 
 
241 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition (New York: Free Press, 2003), 
169-185. 
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UK students’ opinions, Islam on Campus (Appendix). This survey is the most 
comprehensive survey ever undertaken on Muslim student opinion in the UK. 
Based on a specially commissioned YouGov poll of 14,000 students, augmented 
by fieldwork and interviews, it clearly shows that Muslims who once espoused 
extremist and intolerant thoughts have grown dissatisfied and are questioning the 
adoption-versus-rejection decision previously made in favor of radicalization.242  
Examining the survey results, we find quite a number of students 
engaging in what Rogers calls a “discontinuance” phenomenon—a decision to 
reject an innovation after having previously adopted it. Sixty-eight percent of 
Muslim students consider themselves to be British, while 78 percent believe it is 
possible to be both Muslim and British. Likewise, only 4 percent of them think it is 
justified to kill when it comes to preserving their religion.243 This could be a result 
of the dissatisfaction that comes about when an innovation is inappropriate for 
individuals and does not result in any perceived advantages over other 
alternatives.244 This state of dissonance that Muslims in the UK suffer from 
seems to be due to their frustration with not finding the right means through 
which to redress their grievances. Here, then is our cognitive opening. Here is a 
situation that can potentially be rescued by diffusing a new innovation.  
The following discussion will debate the possibility and prospect that two 
very different kinds of idea could help counter radicalization among Muslims in 
the UK. One alternative is to theologically propagate a softer image of religion—
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to help strengthen the Muslim community by reinvigorating family values. Both 
these alternatives could be pursued independently or diffused side by side as 
described below.   
C. CONTOURS OF DE-RADICALIZATION CAMPAIGN 
1. Problems with Calling for a Theological Innovation  
a.  Need for an Alternate Community  
As illustrated in Chapter IV, Islamists have an elaborate system by 
which they spread their message, and which has developed and gained people’s 
trust over a long period of time. The Mavens, Connectors, and Salesmen who 
assist with this are individuals who are not necessarily Islamists themselves, but 
almost all have a bias toward religion and being religious. They, like any good 
religious believers, adhere to certain beliefs that would be very difficult to alter. 
Here, I am not suggesting that these beliefs can never change; what I am saying 
is that people’s religious beliefs evolve through a long natural process—
radicalization of a small segment of society simply hooks onto this. Hence, if we 
want to bring about some change in religious thinking among the UK’s Muslims, 
this too can only be done over a prolonged period and through inculcation of an 
altogether different mindset. That, in turn, will require an alternate community to 
support the proliferation of our new theological ideas. Yet, creation or 
identification of an alternate community would present a huge problem.  
Enlightened Moderation is the quality or state of becoming rational 
or having reasoning power, or being able to think clearly and make decisions 
based on reason rather than emotions. The concept of Enlightened Moderation 





is that enlightened moderation should apply to all spheres of life, but most 
importantly to practicing Islam. The aim is that Islam be practiced moderately, as 
opposed to practicing a fundamentalist version. 
Presently, there are very few Mavens who could act as beacons of 
Islamic Enlightened Moderation. But even if there were such experts and we 
parachuted them into the UK from abroad, imported Mavens would require time 
to establish their status. When it comes to Connectors, we are somewhat better 
off. But still, social networks among UK Muslims are dominated by those willing 
to promote the Islamist message. It would be futile to try to transmit an opposing 
theological message through these same Connectors. Lastly, where would we 
find Salesmen? The most vocal and active Salesmen are already committed to 
the Islamists’ message. If they wanted to “sell” moderation, presumably they 
already would have done that; but, they know such ideas would not get them 
enough support. Besides, there is skepticism among Muslims regarding any new 
interpretation; it would be very difficult for the persuaders to introduce new 
theological reasoning.  
b. Potential for Backfire  
Though the poll results exhibited in the Appendix clearly show that 
the vast majority of Muslims in the UK espouse moderate religious views, any 
new religious interpretation would be looked at as an innovation in the field of 
theology and could prove counter-productive by appearing to create fitna or 
bid’ah (heresy or innovation). Any new interpretation of religious thought, 
especially one supported by the UK government, cannot be expected to draw 
much of an audience. It could, in fact, end up doing quite the opposite. It might 
give renewed energy/impetus to the Islamists’ fading narrative, especially in the 
absence of a robust alternate community to support or promote the new religious 
thinking. Hence, to counter radicalization our idea should not be one that the 
radicals could counter on theological grounds. Instead, it should be one that they 
cannot theologically dispute at all.  
 92
As discussed in Chapters III  and IV, for an idea to spread requires 
a conducive environment; the Power of Context is important. In an environment 
where most UK Muslims still feel the West is hostile toward Islam, it would be a 
mistake to go forward with any plan that counts on a theological innovation—and 
one that Islamists can construe as Westerners trying to change Islam. Just as no 
fashion store should expect to sell great coats with much success in the middle 
of summer, one must not try to sell a new idea about a theological 
reinterpretation in the wrong climate.   
c. Addressing British Government Sensitivities 
As part of the overall context, it is also important to understand how 
the British general public looks at this issue. Some segments of British society, to 
include the government, might not be very forthcoming and comfortable with or 
supportive of the idea of sponsoring or spreading religious ideas. Besides, 
Britons might find these threatening. Islam, after all, remains a religion practiced 
by a thin minority of the population. Giving unnecessary importance to Islam 
might create problems within British society, which strives to appear ecumenical 
and multi-cultural. Similarly, too much prominence to Islam might not be 
politically feasible for authorities since there is already an argument made by 
many non-Muslims that any concession in terms of religion might embolden the 
Islamists and threaten the security of the UK government and the English people.  
2.  Strengthening Family Can Counter Radicalization   
a. Strengths of Argument  
(1) Strong Family Values: Family values are considered a 
strength among Muslims, especially in the case of South Asian and Middle 
Eastern families. Therefore, the push to strengthen the family as a basic building 
block of a non-violent community would be something that would not be 
considered alien to their traditions. These families normally believe that when 
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parents directly monitor and/or supervise their children’s interaction with peers, 
they facilitate and regulate the development of the children’s social skills. Parents 
consciously and subconsciously influence their youngsters’ reference group 
orientations in an effort to shape their values and attitudes. As I have described 
in Chapter III, family elders are apprehensive about the prospects of their 
children losing their forefathers’ traditions. For them, a call to rebuild Muslim 
society around families would be a welcome step. Similarly, since the elders 
themselves have experience living within tightly bonded families, it would easy 
for them to adapt and organize their lives accordingly. 
(2) Family as a Guide: The Islamists have developed their 
community to control and monitor their activists’ activities. As Ed Husain’s 
autobiography and other literature shows us, the sense of belonging and warmth 
the activists enjoy is stronger then that they feel for their own families. This is 
primarily because their parents are either too busy to spare some time for them, 
or parents are considered by their grown-up children to be too traditionalist. 
Because they are seen to be old-fashioned, they cannot provide the necessary 
guidance regarding day-to-day problems. Feeling neglected when it came to how 
to handle the challenges of adolescence, Ed Husain, for instance, sought 
guidance from Islamists—and later did the same for other Muslims.  
If the family system was reinvigorated and supported by the 
mosques, parents could win back control from the Islamists. This would assist 
parents to monitor standards of acceptable conduct, maintain limits, and 
encourage participation in some activities and discourage participation in others. 
The aim here would be to bring Muslim children back within the fold of their 
parents’ tolerant and non-violent religion.   
(3) Providing Social Warmth: Reinvigorating and Strengthening 
the extended family system would provide social warmth. Belonging to an 
extended family should make children feel secure, not stifled. By encouraging 
more family oriented events, the community would ensure that, with lots of 
cousins, aunts, and uncles, youth do not feel alone. In large extended families, 
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they will always be able to find a trusted friend with whom they can share their 
personal feelings. When every member of the family can look inwards and realize 
he has a place of value in the family mosaic, much needed harmony, which most 
young Muslims now miss, would be available. Also, and just as important, the 
more warmth and significance families retain, the less the lack of Britons’ warmth 
should matter and, as a result, the less alienated youth should need to feel.  
Not only would strengthening this family connectivity reduce the 
Islamists’ ability to dominate, but would make the family the cocoon in which 
adaptation to living in the West is best handled: families make traditions together. 
It is important for Britons to see that Muslim parents want their children to grow 
up well educated and well mannered to perform well in the broader UK society, 
while still retaining a non-defiant but proud sense of identity. 
(4) Family Support: A vigorous family-based social life will not 
only reduce the dominance of the Islamists’ networks, but will also provide 
parents and other family elders an excellent means by which to engage the 
younger family members and fully exploit familiarity and word-of-mouth 
persuasion mechanisms for raising respectful young people. Father, mother, 
elder brothers, sisters, and even grandparents will all be there to provide the 
necessary support and guidance to the family’s adolescents. Some might argue 
that persuasion is best carried out through “weaker ties.” I agree that this is true 
to an extent, but it by no means suggests that at any stage in one’s life parents 
and other caring family members should see their influence diminished.  
Indeed the stretch (or breadth and depth) of extended families also 
means that the influence of adults will remain strong, since parents will have 
other adults to rely on. They will be able to gather strength from numbers, which 
in turn means they should be able to relax their individual vigilance. This should 
help ease tensions with their own children. Parental warmth, respectful 
treatment, and clearly defined limits will likewise let adolescents know their 
parents care for and about them. 
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(5) Overcoming Identity Crisis:  Weak and in some cases almost 
non-existent family bonds have left young Muslims in Britain caught between the 
beliefs and networks of their parents and those of the host society. This 
confusion, along with feelings of disenfranchisement and discrimination, creates 
an identity crisis. Reinvigorating the extended family would help youth overcome 
the trauma of their identity crisis by granting them a firm sense of belonging to a 
network of peers, in the form of cousins and other relatives who would help put 
family first. Muslim youth, in this way, would be connected with the wider British 
society through having a sense of place and belonging to something.  
(6) British Societal Support: Non-Muslim Britons have an equal 
stake in containing this contagion of radicalization among Muslims. They should 
look at such a counter-radicalization program favorably. Many Britons consider 
the decline of family values a problem country-wide. One can assume that most 
Britons would fully support British government assistance in reviving strong 
families in Muslim communities. 
b. Weaknesses of Argument  
(1) Fears of Importing Foreign Influence: Strengthening the 
family system might make it seen difficult to fully merge Muslims into British 
society. Their attachment to tradition might lead to further exclusion of their 
community. There are also chances that, by strengthening traditional family 
bonds, Muslims in the UK might end up importing foreign influences from South 
Asia and the Middle East, where the mood is generally anti-Western and the 
environment is unstable. Melanie Phillips,  in her book Londonistan, describes 
fears of these connections inflaming sentiments in the UK.246  
(2) Opposition from Segments of Muslim Youth: Older Muslims, 
especially those who belong to the second and third generations living in the UK, 
might find family bonds too restrictive on their freedom. The generation gap 
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between these young kids and their parents might also hinder any move toward 
making the family a building block of Muslim society. Most second and third 
generation Muslim children also look at their forefathers’ home country traditions 
as being too orthodox and restrictive. Consequently, a call to strengthen family 
traditions could aggravate the clash of values that already exists between 
parents and their British born children.   
(3) Infeasible for Muslim Parents: Most Muslim families belong 
to the lower or lower middle class. In such cases both husbands and wives are 
working, often at odd times. Parents in such families are so preoccupied with 
trying to make ends meet that it would be very difficult for them to spare some 
time for themselves and family—for them this would be too great a luxury.  
3. Constructing Suitable Narratives 
To propagate an innovation requires a suitable narrative. The most 
complex aspect of a De-radicalization Campaign is to write or contextualize the 
narrative for of our innovation. This involves constructing meta-narratives, which 
act as over-arching big themes that set the parameters for “stories” to be told at 
individual, local, and community levels.  
a. Meta-Narrative 
An example of a meta-narrative for strengthening family would be 
something like this: 
Forced marriages, drugs and criminality, employment issues, 
racism, political representation, faith, freedom, along with the notion 
of home and belonging are some of the problem areas that pop up 
frequently whenever one discusses the predicaments of young 
British-born Muslims. To overcome these problems Muslims need 
to not only maintain their distinct identity, but to project themselves 
as useful members of broader society. However, in order to ensure 
that members of the younger generation follow a more progressive 
path, do not get absorbed or seduced by the artificial appeal of the 
West, and become better human beings in terms of this world and 
the world to come, they must be plugged back into old, forgotten 
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traditional family values. British Muslims need a system that 
insulates their children from the wrong influences of society and 
provides them the warmth they long for in an environment in which 
they often feel alienated. Their family is their strength. Just as the 
strength of a building depends on its foundation, if the foundation is 
weak the building is going to crumble. Likewise, the Muslim 
community’s foundation rests on the family system, a home life, on 
how parents bring up their children, and on how connected parents 
and children stay throughout their lives.    
b. Operationalizing the Meta-Narrative  
The application of a meta-narrative demands construction of many 
small narratives, which is a long term process. At this point it might not be 
possible to correctly project how the “family” innovation might be received. 
However, some major sub-narratives can be identified, and these could be 
emphasized as areas to work on: for instance, the quality of family support, 
cohesion—commitment of family members to one another, expressiveness—the 
degree to which family members act openly and express feelings, conflict 
mitigation—addressing disparities among and between members of the family, 
transmission of ethical standards from parents to children, daughters’ close 
positive relationship with their mothers, other relatives’ influence during 
adolescence, etc.  
4. Spreading the Idea of Strengthening the Family System  
a. Law of the Few  
What social infrastructure would be useful for propagating the 
revival of families? The main sub-question here is: Should we look for new 
“influentials” in the community or are they already present?  
The argument can be made that due to the non-theological 
character of our innovation we would not require an alternative community 
through which to spread our ideas. It must be remembered, in a system with 
traditional norms the opinion leaders who favor old traditions are always present. 
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This increases the probability of finding enough “influentials” who would carry the 
new “family” message. These persons can effectively spread our message 
through their social networks.   
(1) Mavens: As already stated, the Mavens are the data 
banks, they are information specialists who are readily available to assist people 
with information sharing. However, unlike ideas pertaining to religion where the 
numbers of qualified people are limited, those knowledgeable about social 
themes like “family” should know no such limits. As far as the issue of finding 
them is concerned, we must look for these individuals in two different age 
groups: older people who enjoy respect and credibility within the older 
generation, and younger people, who are essentially British-born Muslims and 
viewed as successful. The message can also be propagated through religious 
channels since Islam places great importance on family values. Mavens should 
be identified from many different walks of lives. These could be journalists, social 
workers, imams, school teachers, or normal people who have communication 
skills to convey their point of view effectively. Social networks should be used for 
identifying such experts. 
(2) Connectors: Connectors are people with a special gift 
for bringing the world together.247 They are not particular or choosy about 
information and enjoy passing on to others anything they find interesting. They 
are people who naturally occupy the hubs in multiple societal networks. In the 
case of “family” as an innovation, we do not require any separate set of 
Connectors. Connectors are especially important during the initial stages of 
introducing an innovation. However, Connectors merely pass along the 
information and make people aware of new ideas. They have no monopoly over 
persuasion. 
(3) Salesmen: The Salesmen’s role will be the most 
critical. Salesmen help reduce uncertainty about an innovation. These individuals 
must be clear in their own minds about what goals lie behind adoption of the 
 
247 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 38.  
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innovation. Unlike Connectors who mostly help with propagating information, 
Salesmen are practitioners of innovation. Much of their credibility rests in their 
actions. Thus, to persuade people to adopt family values, Salesmen must show 
people the practicability and usefulness of adopting this innovation. They must 
walk the walk and not just talk the talk. The Islamists’ persuasion techniques 
described in Chapters III and IV could be intelligently tailored for the new “family” 
message.      
b. Stickiness Factor 
Likewise, the factors explained by the Heaths (see Chapter IV) can 
be intelligently applied to make the “family” message stickier.  
For instance, the ideas that we devise to persuade people to stand 
behind our notion of strengthening families as a counter-radicalization tool would 
likely be more effective if the ideas were transmitted in language that resonates 
with the experiences of Muslims in the UK. In order to help an innovation take off, 
or tip, the ideas have to be engineered to appeal to both elders and members of 
the younger generation simultaneously. This is going to be a tough task. Old 
values will be acceptable to the elders if these sufficiently reflect older cultural 
traditions; yet for these to attract the attention of the younger population the ideas 
will have to be tailored creatively for today.   
Another aspect that deserves consideration when creating 
stickiness in messages is the issue of sustainability. In order to reach a point that 
the new idea becomes institutionalized, an innovation should be open to 
modification to fit a wide range of conditions. Therefore, we should expect to 
change the tone of our messages as behavior gradually changes.     
c.  Power of Context  
People are usually attracted to an innovation when they feel the 
need for a new alternative. This means creating awareness among people that it 
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is in their interest to seek a stronger family system, given the dissatisfying 
environment in which they find themselves.   
The psychological scars of racialism and disenfranchisement may 
take a long time to fade away in the Muslim community. But interestingly, this 
should help the acceptance of our innovation by providing the proper context. 
Under threatened and strained conditions, it is going to be easier to propagate 
counter-radicalization messages by stressing the need to pull together and look 
within, which is what a return to family offers.  
Nevertheless, overnight changes should not be expected. Ideally, 
family control over younger generations can, in the short term, slow down the 
process of radicalization. By reshaping the environment in this way, the plan 
would be to continue to steer Muslim society away from the Islamists’ path.   
D.  CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I have talked about one possible de-radicalization 
campaign. I have suggested that instead of countering theological ideas, the 
campaign should draw its strengths from ideas that are non-theological in 
character, yet can under-cut the Islamists’ activism. This chapter has discussed 
the strengths and potential pitfalls of this argument and advises that 
strengthening “family” could be ideal for executing a de-radicalization campaign. 
The family environment significantly determines children’s social development. 
During this period, when events in the wider world are bound to continue to 
provoke a sense of moral outrage at apparent injustices against Muslims, and 
when there is unprecedented media influence on adolescent identity, it is very 
important not to lose sight of the significance of family as an indirect tool for 
reversing the process of radicalization among Muslim diasporas in the UK.       
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The terrorist threat to the UK is not new; between 1969 and 1998 over 
3,500 people died in the UK itself as a result of Irish-related terrorism.248 
However, the recent spike of terrorism is quite different. On the one hand, it is 
linked to international terrorism and different militant groups spread throughout 
the Muslim world. On the other hand, there is a domestic and home-grown 
aspect to this terrorism as well.  
Indeed, what is unique is the unforeseen merger of these two types of 
terrorism. If, in the international realm, Muslims see Westerners’ policies as anti-
Muslim and feel humiliated, this is also true domestically in the UK, where Muslim 
diasporas still face the reality of racialism and disenfranchisement. What the 
British face is undoubtedly a domestic predicament. I do not dispute the fact that 
there may be involvement by elements of al-Qaeda, but I feel that it would be a 
mistake to plan counter-actions exclusively focused on externalizing the threat. 
Only by also focusing on the sense of exclusion by British society of Muslims can 
a de-radicalization campaign succeed.  
Recently, the UK Government has revised and issued a detailed counter-
terrorism strategy named “CONTEST.” This strategy has been organized around 
four themes: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare. This thesis has concentrated 
on one of these themes: prevent. My approach, however, has been 
fundamentally different from that of the British government. Instead of preventing 
terrorism from happening, I have proposed reversing the radicalization process 
itself. At the core of this phenomenon of terrorism is diffusion of an innovation 
that sets up a real contest for anyone trying to stem the tide.  
The radicalization that Muslim diasporas in the UK experience today 
follows a distinct pattern. As we have seen, it can be understood by applying the 
Strain Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory, and Framing Theory. It would not 
 
248 The Home Office UK, “The UK’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorists,” 20. 
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be incorrect to dub what the Islamists have achieved an innovation. That is why 
this thesis has argued that the best course of action for de-radicalizing British 
Muslims is to go well beyond employing prevention strategies; these are 
important, but far from sufficient. To trigger de-radicalization we must initiate 
“replacement discontinuance.” This will encourage Muslims to seek a better 
alternative. Successful construction of the “need” for an alternative will 
automatically call for new ideas, which we can plan to proliferate through 
interpersonal interaction and word-of-mouth communications. 
Muslims in the UK are experiencing a youth bulge. Muslim adolescents 
are as idealistic as any youth should be. Our purpose here should be to 
rechannel their passion by introducing them to new ideas and ways of thinking, 
thus making them better “Britons.”  
There are positive indicators coming from Muslims living in the UK, a 
majority of whom strongly oppose radicalization and espouse moderate religious 
views. However, younger Muslims in this diaspora feel alienated, marginalized, 
and excluded from mainstream British society. Such feelings will always keep 
them vulnerable to recruitment and subsequent radicalization.  
At present, any effort to innovate religious thoughts is likely to seen as a 
bid’ah and will fail. Hence, in order to counter the radicalization process I have 
suggested a reorientation or paradigm shift. Instead of contesting the Islamists 
on theological grounds, I have proposed emphasizing the reinvigoration of 
“family” as a counter-radicalization tool. By pursuing this strategy, the UK 
government would avoid direct confrontation with Islamists on religious grounds. 
What the government instead would introduce is a small change that no 
theologian could argue against. In one package, we could remove social strains, 
hamper Islamists’ mobilization mechanisms, and trump their methods of 
message propagation techniques based on familiarity and word-of-mouth 
persuasion.   
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I have proposed spreading this new “family” innovation employing their 
same strategies. Gladwell’s triple laws would provide one effective way to diffuse 
such an innovation. Though the innovation is non-theological, it still can be 
supported by religious figures. The non-religious, but Islam-oriented nature of 
Muslim families lends this innovation an incontestable stature and significance. It 
also enables us to make full use of existing social networks. The thing that must 
be kept in mind is that instead of only mosques, centers of critical activity would 
be shifted to also include homes and schools.  
Parents and teachers should play a greater role in winning back the 
younger generation from Islamist activism. Involvement of as many adults as 
possible is important for two reasons: first, so that they can support one another; 
there is always strength in numbers; second, the aim is not to pit some adults 
against alienated and radicalizable youth. Instead, it is to embed all young people 
in networks of concerned and caring, but also proud and Islam-oriented Britons 
and to channel them in a positive direction.  
Whether “family” is the innovation that can best serve counter-
radicalization is clearly a matter of debate. How to implement the innovation 
deserves further study. There are many areas related to this thesis that can be 
explored further. Others areas I would suggest for further research and 
discussion are: narrative framing and the dynamic involved in adopting 
messages to a shifting environment as social change is under way.     
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632 297 335 Ser No Questions  Details % % % 
Yes  25 24 25 
No  65 64 66 
1 Are you member of your university’s Islamic Society? N/A University does not have an Islamic 
Society   
10 12 9 
I’m committee 
member 8 7 9 
Very active  10 12 9 
Fairly active  27 25 29 
2 
How active would you say 
you are in the Islamic 
Society? 
Not very active  55 57 53 
A religion  13 13 14 
A way of life  30 33 28 
Both  52 48 55 3 
Do you tend to think of 
Islam as a religion or a way 
of life? Not sure  5 6 4 
At least once a day  17 20 15 
Between two and 
five times a week  10 8 11 
About once or twice 
a month  8 12 5 
Less than once a 
month  6 9 3 
I have never visited 
the campus prayer 
room  
8 8 8 
4 
How often, if it all, do you 
visit the campus prayer 
room at your university? 
N/A 51 42 58 
Islam is a religion 
whilst Islamist is a 
olitical ideology  p
36 35 36 
They are both part 
of the same thing 16 18 14 
Neither of these  22 21 23 
5 
Which, if any, of the 
following statements comes 
closer to your views? 
Not sure 27 26 28 
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632 297 335 Ser No Questions Details % % % 
Very supportive  28 32 25 
Fairly supportive  26 24 27 
Not very supportive  14 14 14 
Not at all supportive 10 10 11 
6 
How supportive would you 
be of the establishment of 
the Islamic political party to 
represent the views of 
Muslims at Parliament? Not sure  22 21 23 
My parents are 
much more strict 
Muslims than me  
40 45 35 
My parents are 
slightly more strict 
Muslims than I am 
33 32 34 
My parents are 
slightly more liberal 
Muslims than I am  
14 9 17 
My parents are 
much more liberal 
Muslims than I am 
4 7 1 
7 How would you describe that difference? 
Not sure  10 7 12 
Based on the Quran 
and Sunnah  19 21 18 
Not based on the 
Quran or Sunnah  18 19 16 
Neither of these  9 10 9 
8 Do you consider Sufism to be …? 
Not sure 54 50 57 
An ancient Islamic 
practice 21 21 20 
Developed under 
Greek and Hindu 
influence  
10 12 9 
Both of these  6 7 4 
Neither of these  11 12 10 
9 Do you consider Sufism to be …? 
Not sure 53 48 57 
Yes  39 37 40 
No  25 24 26 10 
Can we interpret Shariah 
depending upon time and 
place  Not sure  36 39 34 
Tend to allow  24 27 21 
Tend to prohibit  16 17 16 
Quran makes no 
reference  10 9 11 
11 
Does Islam tend to allow or 
prohibit interpretation of 
Shariah  




632 297 335 Ser No Questions Details % % % 
I am British  62 63 61 
Partially British  21 16 25 
I am not British  12 14 10 12 
To what an extent if at all 
you consider yourself to be 
a British? Not sure  5 7 4 
Yes 78 74 81 
No, being British 
comes first  3 3 3 
No, being Muslim 
comes first  12 16 10 
13 
Do you think its possible to 
be both Muslim and British 
equally? 
Not sure  7 8 6 
Very compatible  29 34 26 
Fairly compatible  39 37 40 
Fairly incompatible  8 7 10 
Very incompatible  5 6 4 
14 
Is Islam compatible with 
Western notions of 
democracy? 
Not sure  19 17 21 
Very supported  15 16 15 
Fairly supportive  18 20 16 
Not very supportive  12 11 14 
Not at all supportive 13 15 12 
15 
Are you supportive of 
Caliphate based on Shariah 
Law? 
Not sure  41 39 44 
Very important  30 26 34 
Fairly important  29 30 28 
Not very important  19 20 18 
Not at all important  12 11 14 
16 
How important to Islam do 
you think it is that Muslim 
women wear the hijab? 
Not sure  10 13 7 
Women should 
wear the hijab 31 30 31 
It is up to the 
dividual Muslim 
woman as to 
whether or not she 
chooses to wear 
hijab 
in
61 58 64 17 
Which of the following 
statements comes closer to 
your view? 
Not sure  8 12 5 
Yes, they should  89 88 91 
No they should not  5 4 5 18 
Do you believe that men 
and women should be 




632 297 335 Ser No Questions Details % % % 
Yes, to preserve 
religion  4 3 4 
Yes, if religion is 
under attack    28 32 24 
No, not justified  53 46 59 
19 Is it ever justifiable to kill in the name of religion? 
Not sure  15 19 13 
My respect 
increased  30 32 27 
My respect 
decreased  20 20 19 
No change: I 
espect British 
society anyway  
r 26 24 28 
No change: I didn’t 
respect British 
society anyway 
3 2 4 
20 
How has the British public 
reaction to the war in Iraq 
affected the amount of 
respect you have for British 
society? 
Not sure  21 21 22 
UK  70 67 72 
Middle East  4 4 4 
Asia  3 3 2 
Europe – excl UK  3 3 2 
USA  4 3 4 
21 
 
Where would you like to 
settle down for work? 
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